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CHAPTER 12 
Constitutional Law 
ARTHUR L. BERNEY* AND STEPHEN J. BUCHBINDER** 
§12.1. Prejudgment Possessory Remedies and Due Process: Re-
view of Supreme Court Decisions. In the last few years, federal and 
state courts across the country, including those in the Commonwealth, 
have struggled to determine the meaning, scope, and application of 
the United States Supreme Court's decisions on the requirements of 
due process in the context of prejudgment possessory remedies. 1 This 
is no mean feat since the Supreme Court, for the third time in fewer 
years, has made conflicting or, at best, finely distinguished statements 
on the subject.2 A short review of these recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncements on prejudgment possessory remedies (e.g. garnishment, 
replevin, sequestration, and attachment) is essential to an appreciation 
of the two pertinent developments in the Massachusetts courts during 
the Survey year3 in Mcintrye v. Associates Financial Services Co., Inc. 4 and 
Porter v. Fleischhacker. 5 
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court held the Georgia pre-
judgment garnishment procedures unconstitutional in North Georgia 
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 6 The opinion in North Georgia relied 
*ARTHUR L. BERNEY is a Professor of Law· at Boston College Law School. 
**STEPHEN J. BUCHBINDER is an associate with the Jaw firm of Norris, Kozodoy & 
Krasnoo, Boston. 
The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Jeffrey S. Sabin, a 
second-year student at Boston College Law School. Mr. Sabin provided research assis-
tance on various aspects of the chapter and was the author of § 12.8. 
§12.1. 1See, e.g., Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Younger v. 
Plunkett, 395 F. Supp. 702 (E,D. Pa. 1975); Girley v. Wood, 525 S.W.2d 454 (Ark. 
1975); McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure and 
Substance-Repossession and Adhesion Contract Issues, 26 HASTINGS L. REV. 383 (1974); 
Note, Changing Concepts of Consumer Due Process in the Supreme Court- The New Conserva-
tive Majority Bids Farewell to Fuentes, 60 IowA L. REv. 262 (1974). 
2 Compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 
U.S. 600 (1974) and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 
(1975). See text at notes 15-19, infra. 
3 See§§ 12.2. and 12.3, infra. 
4 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1490, 328 N.E. 2d 492. 
5 No. 00538 Eq. (Boston Housing Ct., Jan. 15, 1975). 
6 419 u.s. 601 (1975). 
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expressly 7 on the 1972 decision in Fuentes v. Shevin, 8 where the Court 
struck down, as violative of due process of law, Florida and Pennsyl-
vania replevin statutes. 9 Generally, these statutes permitted the repos-
session of collateral upon a debtor's alleged default in payments, 
without providing the debtor prior notice or an ·opportunity for a 
hearing. 10 North Georgia would have been an unremarkable application 
of precedent were it not for the fact that the vitality of Fuentes had 
been directly called into question in 1974 by the Court's intervening 
decision in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. 11 
In Mitchell, the Court considered the constitutionality of Louisiana 
sequestration procedures, whereby a creditor upon ex parte application 
without notice to the debtor or an opportunity for a hearing, could 
obtain a writ of sequestration (the civil law equivalent of replevin). 12 
The Court upheld the challenged Louisiana provisions, distinguishing 
Fuentes on the grounds that under the statutory scheme presented in 
Mitchell, unlike that considered in Fuentes: (I) the creditor could not 
prevail by making bare, conclusory allegations, but had to file an af-
fidavit stating specific facts warranting sequestration; 13 (2) the state 
official issuing the writ was a judge rather than a court clerk; 14 and 
(3) the facts relevant to obtaining a writ of sequestration were nar-
rowly confined to the existence of a vendor's lien and the issue of de-
fault, rather than the broad "wrongfully detained" standard applicable 
to replevin in Fuentes. 15 Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opin-
ion in Fuentes, found the distinctions advanced in Mitchell un-
persuasive and concluded that Fuentes had been overruled. 16 
7 /d. at 605. 
"407 u.s. 67 (1972). 
9 /d. at 96. 
10 !d. at 80. 
11 416 u.s. 600,611 (1974). 
12 /d. at 603-07. 
13 /d. at 616. 
Ia. Although the Louisiana statutory scheme, LA. CODE CIV. P. ANN., ART. 281-3 
(1961), provided in general for the issuance of writs by clerks of court, in the Orleans 
Parish, where the writ in Mitchell was obtained, issuance had to be made by a judge. See 
416 U.S. at 606 n.5. 
15 416 U.S. at 616-20. See Cronin, Constitutional Law, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. Law § 
10.6, at 210-15. 
16 See 416 U.S. 600, 632 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Although admitting that the stan-
dardized Louisiana sequestration form called for more detailed information than that 
required by the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes, Justice Stewart stressed that 
this procedure still tested "no more than the strength of the applicant's own belief in 
his rights." /d. at 632. He also found the second distinction of little constitutional sig-
nificance, since "[w]hether the issuing functionary be a judge or a court clerk, he can in 
any eve~t do no. more than ascertain the formal sufficiency of the plaintifFs allegations, 
after whiCh the Issuance of the summary writ becomes a ministerial act." Id. at 632-33. 
Finally, Justice Stewart aptly noted that the issues to be resolved in both cases-the exis-
tence of a security interest and the debtor-vendee's default-were identical. See id. at 
633. 
As the Court stated in Fuentes, the relative complexity of the issues in dispute does 
not affect the right to a prior hearing: "The issues decisive of the ultimate right to con-
2
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As if to vindicate the claim that Fuentes had been distinguished in 
Mitchell, and not overruled, 17 Justice White, writing for the majority in 
North Georgia, found that the Georgia statutory scheme contained cer-
tain defects that were not present in the Louisiana provisions consid-
ered in Mitchell: (1) the writ in Georgia could be obtained on the 
strength of an affidavit containing only conclusory allegations; (2) the 
writ was issuable by a court clerk or other authorized officer without 
participation by a judge; and (3) there was no provision for an early 
postseizure hearing at which the debtor could challenge the validity of 
the garnishment, the debtor being required to file a bond in order to 
dissolve the garnishment. 18 
tinued possession, of course, may be quite simple. The simplicity of the issues might be 
relevant to the formality, or scheduling of a prior hearing .... But it certainly cannot 
undercut the right to a prior hearing of some kind." 407 U.S. at 87 n. 18. 
In unusually pointed language, Justice Stewart, concluding that Mitchell was constitu-
tionally indistinguishable from Fuentes and that the Court had simply rejected the 
reasoning of that case and adopted instead the analysis of the Fuentes dissent, remarked 
that "the only perceivable change that has occurred since the Fuentes case is in the 
makeup of this Court." 416 U.S. at 635 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In light of this lan-
guage, it is little wonder that the bar assumed that Fuentes had been overruled by 
Mitchell, as suggested by Justice Stewart (joined by Justice Douglas and Marshall) in a 
dissenting opinion, id. at 635, and Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion. Id. at 623. 
The earlier Fuentes decision had been decided by a four-to-three vote. Justices Powell 
and Rehnquist were not members of the Court when the case was argued, and thus did 
not participate in its "consideration or decision." Id. at 635-36 n.8 (Stewart, J., di&sent-
ing), citing Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 97. Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice 
Blackmun, wrote the dissenting opinion in Fuentes. The 5-4 majority opinion in Mitchell 
consisted of the Fuentes dissenters and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. 
17 This prompted Justice Stewart to file the following droll concurrence in North 
Georgia: "It is gratifying to note that my report of the demise of Fuentes v. Shevin ... 
seems to have been greatly exaggerated. Cf. S. Clemens, cable from Europe to the As-
sociated Press, quoted in 2 A. Paine, Mark Twain: A Biography 1039 (1912)." 419 U.S. 
601, 608 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Rehnquist, in dis-
sent, was in a less humorous mood. He took the opportunity to deliver a sharp criticism 
of the Court for having decided Fuentes, "with its 4-3 vote by a bobtailed Court," when 
the new judicial appointments "were on hand and available to participate on reargu-
ment." Id. at 615, 616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Powell also expressed disa-
greement with the majority opinion insofar as it "appears to resuscitate Fuentes v. She-
vin." Id. at 609. 
18 419 U.S. at 606-07. justice White declared further that the Georgia prejudgment 
garnishment statutes were vulnerable to constitutional attack for the same reasons that 
appeared in Fuentes: 
Here, a bank account, surely a form of property, was impounded and, ... put to-
tally beyond use during the pendency of the litigation on the alleged debt, all by a 
writ of garnishment issued by a court clerk without notice or opportunity for an early 
hearing and without participation by a judicial officer. 
Id. at 606 (emphasis added). Under the Georgia law, a creditor or his attorney could 
file an affidavit before a clerk of court or other authorized officer stating the amount 
claimed to be due and further stating that the affiant had reason to apprehend the loss 
of the same or some part thereof if garnishment should not issue. The creditor was re-
quired to file a bond in a sum double the amount sworn to be due, and the debtor was 
permitted to dissolve the garnishment by filing a bond conditioned to pay any judg-
ment the creditor might recover. Id. at 604. 
3
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Notwithstanding the six-to-three decision in North Georgia, with Jus-
tices White and Powell joining the four Justices of the Fuentes 
majority, it is far from clear that Fuentes has been completely 
revived. 19 Concentration on the opinions of the two Justices who have 
been in the majority in both Mitchell and North Georgia, the so-called 
swing votes of Justices White and Powell, might yield some predictive 
potential.20 
The views of Justices White and Powell coincide with one another 
and differ from those of the Fuentes majority in two significant re-
spects. First, both Justice White and Justice Powell appear to believe 
that prejudgment attachment remedies meet constitutional standards 
by providing a prompt and adequate postattachment hearing, at 
which the claimant would be required to demonstrate at least prob-
able cause for the attachment of the property of another. Justice Pow-
ell expressed himself on this point in the following terms: 
The most compelling deficiency in the Georgia procedure is its 
failure to provide a prompt and adequate postgarnishment 
hearing. . . . Moreover, the Georgia statute contains no provision 
19 Still, matters may not be as bad as Justice Blackmun suggests: 
[W]e [are] ... immersed in confusion, with Fuentes one way, Mitchell another, and 
now this case decided in a manner that leaves counsel and the commercial com-
munities in other States uncertain as to whether their own established and long-
accepted statutes pass constitutional muster with a wavering tribunal off in 
Washington, D.C. 
/d. at 619 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). 
20 Other distinctions have been drawn by various justices but none of these appear to 
have the assent of a majority coalition. For example, Justice White's view that it makes a 
difference that a judicial officer, rather than a clerk, issue the writ was rejected by the 
Fuentes m,Yority, (416 U.S. at 632, Stewart, J., dissenting), by Justice Powell (419 U.S. at 
611 n.3, concurring), and by the three dissenters in North Georgia (419 U.S. at 619, 
Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
The effort to draw a distinction between commercial interests and personal interests 
(e.g. wages in Sniadach) or between parties of equal bargaining power and victims of 
contracts of adhesion, was rejected by the majority in North Georgia, 419 U.S. at 608. In 
view of his concurring position in that case, it is doubtful whether Justice Powell could 
join the North Georgia dissenters in making something of that distinction. See id. at 619 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf. 416 U.S. at 628 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). 
Similarly, the requirement that the claimant post a security bond, though possibly a 
necessary condition, is plainly not a sufficient condition for a valid law. The majority 
opinion in Fuentes represents the likeliest view to be taken on this and other specific 
conditions or safeguards: 
The minimal deterrent effect of a bond requirement is, in a practical sense, no 
substitute for an informed evaluation by a neutral official. More specifically, as a 
matter of constitutional principle, it is no replacement for the right to a prior hear-
ing that is the only truly effective safeguard against arbitrary deprivation of prop-
erty. While the existence of these other, less effective, safeguards may be among 
the considerations that affect the form of hearing demanded by due process, they 
are far from enough by themselves to obviate the right to a prior hearing of some 
kind. 
407 U.S. at 83-84. 
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enabling the debtor to obtain prompt dissolution of the garnish-
ment upon a showing of fact, nor any indication that the gar-
nishor bears the burden of proving entitlement to the 
garnishment. 21 
Justice White's position on this question cannot be established with 
equal certitude. One of the grounds upon which he distinguished 
Mitchell from North Georgia is that in the former case the debtor is 
"expressly entitled ... to an immediate hearing after seizure and to 
dissolution of the writ absent proof by the creditor of the grounds on 
which the writ was issued."22 Nevertheless, Justice White does cite 
with approval the language from Fuentes that states "[t]he Fourteenth 
Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day, 1 0-day, or 
50-day deprivations of property."23 Perhaps the critical indication of 
his individual view, however, is to be found in his careful choice of 
language in the holding of the North Georgia case.24 He does not say 
"without notice or opportunity for a pre-attachment hearing." He says 
"without notice or opportunity for an early hearing. "25 Thus, it would 
appear that the "swing" Justices would find a prompt and adequate 
postattachment probable cause hearing an acceptable substitute for 
the requirement of a similar preattachment hearing. 
The second point upon which these two Justices concur has not yet 
been recognized as an explicit ground for distinguishing among the 
cases, but its potential cannot be denied. According to both Justices, 
the requirements of due process may well depend on whether or not 
the claimant has a preexisting property interest in the property over 
which he seeks to assert control. This distinction is a central point in 
Justice White's dissent in Fuentes 26 and stands as a sort of preamble to 
his opinion for the Court in Mitchell. 27 Justice Powell demonstrated his 
belief in the importance of this distinction by relying upon it to dis-
tinguish both Mitchell and Fuentes from Sniadach v. Family Finance 
21 419 U.S. at 613 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 625 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
22 419 U.S. at 607. 
23 /d. at 606, quoting Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 86. 
24 419 U.S. at 606. See note 18 supra. 
25 419 U.S. at 606. 
26 407 U.S. at 67, 102 (White, J., dissenting). 
27 416 U.S. at 604. 
/d. 
Plainly enough, this is not a case where the property sequestered by the court is 
exclusively the property of the defendant debtor. The question is not whether a 
debtor's property may be seized by his creditors, pendente lite, where they hold no 
present interest in the property sought to be seized. The reality is that both seller 
and buyer had' current, real interests in the property, and the definition of prop-
erty rights is a matter of state law. Resolution of the due process question must 
take account not only of the interests of the buyer of the property but those of the 
seller as well. 
5
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Corp.: 28 "[Sniadach] is readily distinguishable from the instant case 
[Mitchell] where the creditor does have a pre-existing property interest 
as a result of the vendor's lien .... Thus, we deal here with mutual 
property interests, both of which are entitled to be safeguarded. 
Fuentes overlooked this vital point."29 
Justice Blackmun's description of the state of matters after North 
Georgia may well be accurate: "[T]he Court now has embarked on a 
case-by-case analysis (weighed heavily in favor of Fuentes and with lit-
tle hope under Mitchell) of the respective state statutes in this area. 
That road is a long and unrewarding one, and provides no satisfac-
tory answers to issues of constitutional magnitude."30 Yet, whatever 
criticisms may be levelled at Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia, these 
three opinions, taken together with Sniadach, do not leave the road 
wholly uncharted. 
§12.2. Prejudgment Possessory Remedies: Self-Help and State 
Action. Two cases dealing with the validity of landlords' power to 
distrain-i.e., to exercise a possessory lien through seizure 
of-personal effects of lodgers, under provisions of the Massachusetts 
boardinghouse keepers lien statute, 1 were decided during the Survey 
year. The cases reached incompatible results. In one case, Porter v. 
Fleischhacker, 2 the Boston Housing Court found the statute, section 23 
of chapter 255 of the General Laws, unconstitutional. 3 In the other 
case, Davis v. Richmond, 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit declined to pass on the validity of the statute on the 
ground that the landlord's actions pursuant to section 23 did not con-
stitute "state action."5 Consequently, no question of constitutionality 
under the due process clause or of violation of federal law was 
presented. 6 Davis is the subject of an extended student comment, 
infra, 7 and will therefore only be referred to comparatively in connec-
28 395 u.s. 337 (1969). 
29 416 U.S. at 628 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). 
30 419 U.S. at 620 (B1ackmun, J ., dissenting). 
§12.2. I G.L. c. 255, § 23. 
2 No. 00538 Eq. (Boston Housing Ct., Jan. 15, 1975). 
3 Porter, at 4. 
4 512 F.2d 201 (lst Cir. 1975). 
5 /d. at 205. 
6 /d. The federal action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Id. at 201. Thus, 
technically, it can be said that the question of requisite governmental action arose under 
the "color of law" language of§ 1983. See Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1110 (3d 
Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 741 (2d Cir. 1974). As to whether 
this makes any difference, see the discussion in United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 
794 n.7 (1966). See also Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 115 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
7 See § 12.9 infra. 
Differences over the validity of lodg:ing_ house lien provisions are not exactly earth-
shaking. The real significance of the debate, of course, is how it bears on socially and 
economically more important forms of self-help repossession, particularly repossession 
6
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tiol) with the discussion of Porter_ which follows. 
The facts in Porter were simple. The plaintiff rented a furnished 
room on a weekly basis in the defendant's lodging house. When the 
plaintiff failed to return to the room for two weeks and missed three 
successive rental payments, the defendant entered the premises, 
changed the lock, and seized the personal effects of the plaintiff. 8 The 
defendant landlord refused to return the plaintiffs belongings until 
the rent arrears were paid. This was in accordance with the landlord's 
usual practice once he had determined that a lodger who owed rent 
had abandoned a room. 9 
The plaintiff brought a bill in equity in the housing court seeking 
the return of his property, damages, and declaratory relief. 10 He al-
leged that the failure to follow formal eviction procedures was a 
ground for relief, 11 and that the lockout, seizure, and subsequent re-
fusal to return personal property constituted unfair and deceptive 
practices. 12 The court, finding that the plaintiff had abandoned the 
premises, denied all prayers for ir:Uunctive relief and damages. 13 It 
ordered the return of the personal belongings only upon posting of a 
bond, and ruled that the defendant's refusal to return the belongings 
prior thereto "was under color of law, i.e., G.L. c. 255, § 23 et seq.,"14 
and therefore "was not, ... in violation of G.L. c_ 93A."15 
of goods under U.C.C. § 9-503. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 
1974). 
Justice White in his dissenting opinion in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), 
leaves no doubt that the validity of self-help repossession looms behind the Fuentes case. 
See id. at 102 (White, J., dissenting) and see text at note 56 infra. See also note 59 infra. 
8 Porter, at 2. 
9 !d. 
10 !d. at 1, 3-4. Upon the posting of a bond by the plaintiff, the personal property was 
returned by the defendant. !d. at 3. 
11 !d. at 3. G.L. c. 239, § 1 et seq. provide summary eviction procedures in Mass-
achusetts. Acts of 1970, c. 842, § 9 provides the relevant administrative eviction proce-
dures in Massachusetts. 
12 See Porter, at 3-4. The plaintiff apparently based a part of his damages claim upon 
violation of the Massachusetts consumer protection laws, specifically G.L. c. 93A. See 
Porter, at 3-4. 
13 !d. 
14 The court in Porter described the nature and operation of G.L. c. 255 as follows: 
The lien created by § 23 is what is commonly called a possessory lien, i.e., the 
lien is perfected by the lienor taking possession of the property subject to the lien. 
The lien may be enforced, i.e., the property subject to the lien sold by court order 
and the proceeds applied to satisfy the underlying debt, pursuant to G.L., c. 255, 
§§ 26-29. The owner of the property subject to the lien may redeem it pursuant to 
G.L., c. 255, §§ 32, 33 and 36. G.L., c. 140, § 12 in part imposes criminal liability 
upon the lodging or boarding house tenant who removes his baggage and effects 
from the lodging or boarding house while a lien exists thereon for the proper 
charges due from him for fare and board furnished therein. 
Porter, at 4-5. 
15 !d. at 3-4. The court apparently assumed that action taken under color of law, by 
definition, could hardly constitute an unfair and deceptive practice. See id. 
7
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If the case had ended there, it would have been hardly worth not-
ing. In surprising contrast to the denial of injunctive or damage relief, 
however, the court granted the declaratory relief1 6 sought by the 
plaintiff on behalf of a certified class, and declared section 23 of 
chapter 255 of the General Laws unconstitutional.17 In reaching this 
conclusion, the court addressed two questions: (1) whether self-help 
prejudgment remedies, "authorized" by section 23, constituted state 
action, 18 and, if so, (2) whether such self-help remedies met the re-
quirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 
as elucidated in the Fuentes-Mitchell-North Georgia line of cases. 19 The 
court postponed consideration of the first question-"one of the 
liveliest on the current judicial scene,"20 -to its resolution of the sec-
ond issue.21 This unorthodox reversal of the discussion order, exam-
ining the due process issue first, though possibly at variance with 
tenets of judicial review, 22 actually served to enlighten the state action 
question. 23 
18 Porter, at 4. Judge Garrity's opinion provides no reasons for limiting the operation 
of the judgment of unconstitutionality to declaratory relief. See id. Presumably, the 
judge believed that the return of plaintiffs personal property fulfilled the requirements 
of equity in the instant case and that the finding of abandonment of the premises was 
ground enough to entitle the defendant to recovery of rent arrears. Nothing in the 
opinion vitiates the force of the bond the plaintiff was required to post. 
It is also likely that Judge Garrity was concerned about avoiding the difficulties of the 
retroactive application of the declaration of unconstitutionality. See § 12.3 infra. 
17 Porter, at 4. The opinion is also less than explicit about the basis and scope of the 
holding of unconstitutionality. The plaintiff sought to have G.L. c. 255, §§ 23, 26-30 
declared invalid as "unconstitutional on [their] face and in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments ... and ... in violation of Part I, Article 10 of the 
[Massachusetts] Constitution." ld. Judge Garrity's only direct response to this prayer 
was: "I ... declare § 23 unconstitutional. ... " Id. 
18 See id. at 7-9. 
19 See id. at 5-7. The Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia cases are discussed fully in § 
12.1 supra. 
20 Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917, 919 (D. Mass. 1973). 
21 See notes 18 and 19 and accompanying text supra. 
22 Cf. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring), for the proposition that "[t]he Court will not 'anticipate a question of 
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' " 
13 Ever since the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), where state action is at issue, it 
has usually been treated as a threshold question, the resolution of which governs the 
necessity of deciding the underlying substantive constitutional challenge. The result is 
that state action questions are often decided in a vacuum. Nonetheless, the determina-
tion of state action is not unrelated to the underlying constitutional claim being pressed. 
The Supreme Court has recently held that a utility company's service termination for 
nonpayment was not subject to the requirements of a due process hearing, even though 
the company was subject to extensive state regulation and was the sole provider of an 
essential service, because the conduct of the company was not state action. Jackson v. 
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358-59 (1974). Justice Marshall, however, in a 
dissenting opinion, asked the troubling question: what would have been the result if the 
company had "refused to extend service to Negroes.'' Id. at 365, 374. In Amalgamated 
Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), the 
8
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In its discussion of the due process issue, the court in Porter placed 
heavy emphasis on the point that section 23 not only failed to provide 
for notice and an opportunity for an adversarial hearing prior to the 
seizure of property, but even failed to meet the lesser standard of an 
ex parte judicial hearing. Quoting from Mitchell v. W. T. Grant, 24 the 
housing court determined that the Supreme Court "upheld the 
Louisiana statute only because it 'provides for judicial control of the 
process from beginning to end.' "25 Implicit in the housing court's 
reading of Mitchell that the seizure of another's property entails the 
judicial control of the process is the idea that such judicial control is a 
nondelegable function. 26 This exposition underscored the anomaly 
that the Supreme Court could insist that due process requires supervi-
sion by a judge, as opposed to mere "court functionaries," but might 
not be troubled by "supervision" by the opposing party. 27 Oddly, the 
court never drew the implication of nondelegable function or con-
nected the anomaly to its state action analysis. Consequently, although 
the analysis of denial of due process is comprehensively and convinc-
ingly m'aintained,28 it is never explicitly brought to bear on the more 
controversial question ofstate action. 
The court was content to rest its conclusion regarding state action 
on the sole ground that the existence of statutory authority alone con-
stituted state action.29 The court's reasoning on this point was that 
lodging house owners, in contrast to innkeepers, had no right to self-
help possessory liens at common law.30 Therefore, the right, being 
statutorily created, had its source in governmental action in its most 
formal manifestation: legislation.31 Possibly, the court's concentration 
on this argument, to the exclusion of all others, was provoked by its 
desire to refute the conflicting federal district court opinion in Davis 
v. Richmond. 32 In an excess of fervor, the housing court attacked the 
Court clearly considered the merits of the underlying first amendment claims first in 
deciding that union members could conduct picketing within a privately owned shop-
ping center. Essentially, the Court held that businesses in the suburbs could not use the 
doctrine of state action to "immunize themselves from ... criticism by creating a cordon 
sanitaire of parking lots around their stores. Neither precedent nor policy compels a re-
sult so at variance with the goal of free expression and communication." /d. at 325. 
24 416 u.s. 600 (1974). 
25 Porter, at 6, quoting Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 616. 
26 Cf Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,465-70 (1953); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 
299, 320-21 (1941). This idea is alluded to directly, though in a different context, in 
language the housing court chose to quote from Fuentes. See Porter, at 7 and see text at 
notes 52 and 53 infra. 
27 See Porter, at 6-7. Compare Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 611-12 with Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 
U.S. 67,80 (1972). See also text at notes 12-18, § 12.1 supra. 
28 Porter, at 5-7. 
29 /d. at 9. 
30 See id. at 8-9. 
31 /d. at 9. 
3? Civ. Action No. 74-177-G (D. Mass., Aug. 9, 1974). 
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federal district court opinion in Davis for failing to deal with "the 
issue of whether G.L. c. 255, § 23 ... created new rights and evi-
denced state policy favoring actions which were not provided for at 
common law."33 In any event, the First Circuit's opinion in Davis did 
deal with the distinction directly: 
In any event we are disinclined to decide the issue of state in-
volvement on the basis of whether a particular class of creditor 
did or did not enjoy the same freedom to act in Elizabethan or 
Georgian England. The statute at issue is a fairly unremarkable 
product of the continuing legislative function to define creditors' 
rights .... If it goes beyond the common law, it does so merely by 
broadening the class (innkeepers) having traditional right to a 
possessory lien. And even this modest change occurred 115 years 
ago.34 
These points are well taken, but the distinction the housing court 
pressed35 is equally troubling to those who agree with the result in 
Porter. A negative implication that may be drawn from the housing 
court's proposition is that claims that find their source in the common 
law, or even in custom and usage, may not constitute forms of state 
action. 36 If this analysis, that state action turns on whether the chal-
lenged law codified the common law or created new rights, were to be 
""Porter, at 8. The federal district court's memorandum and order of dismissal never 
reached such distinctions, concluding that "state action must rest on some significant 
state involvement other than the mere existence of state laws which are implicated in 
the day-to-day dealings of people." Davis v. Richmond, Civ. Action No. 74-177-G at 2. 
34 512 F.2d 201, 203 (1st Cir. 1975). The First Circuit buttressed its point by quoting 
from Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay On 
The Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. I, 47 (1973): 
The focus for state action purposes should always be on the impact of the law 
upon private ordering, not the law's age or historical underpinnings .... To make 
state action turn upon whether the statutory right being asserted has common law 
origins would lead to anomalous results. The identical private conduct, pursuant to 
the identical state statutory or judicial law, would be state action in some states 
while not in others depending solely upon the fortuitous and unimportant circum-
stances of the age and history of the law. 
512 F.2d at 204. 
35 The distinction was also relied upon in Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 
361 F. Supp. 917, 920-21 (D. Mass. 1973). In view of Davis, the continued efficacy of 
Boland is highly questionable. 
36 The concept of state action received its basic statement in the Civil Rights Cases, 
109 U.S. 3 (1883). The general understanding is that the meaning of state action has 
been less restrictively construed in this century than the last. The following statement, 
however, is drawn from the definition that the majority in the Civil Rights Cases gave the 
term: "[C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggres-
sion, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State au-
thority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings." /d. at 17. 
The "sit-in" cases should be compared respecting the significance of custom and usage. 
See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 161-174 (1970); Bouie v. City of Colum-
bia, 378 U.S. 347,365 (1964) (Black,]., dissenting). 
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adopted by the Supreme Court, serious shadows would be cast on 
such landmark opinions as Shelley v. Kraemer 31 and Adickes v. S.H. Kress 
& Co.3B 
Although the distinction drawn by the housing court may serve the 
function of deciding constitutional cases on the narrowest available 
ground, equally narrow grounds may be discovered that do not entail 
serious negative implications. For example, a court may rest its deci-
sion on the degree that law enforcement officials are involved, even 
on a stand-by basis, in aid of accomplishing the lockout or seizure of 
goods. 39 Indeed, in light of section 12 of chapter 140 of the General 
Laws,40 a court may take judicial notice of the supporting obligations 
and thus likely involvement of the police in any contested seizure of 
property.H Resting a finding of state action on such factual grounds 
as the severity of the burden imposed on the individual whose prop-
erty has been seized42 has the virtue of extending constitutional pro-
tection to the most onerous situations, rather than extending protec-
tion to cases on the basis of irrelevant historical factors. 
The federal circuit courts that have considered the question thus 
far have agreed with the First Circuit that the state action argument is 
not made out simply by demonstrating that the state has enacted legis-
lation concerning activities otherwise unregulated by the common 
law. 43 In the face of this array, a lower state court opinion reaching a 
contrary conclusion must be indeed persuasive in its argument or, al-
ternatively, prove that the resolution of the meaning of state action is 
not exclusively a federal question. Judge Garrity's opinion in Porter 
37 334 U.S. I (1948). 
38 398 U.s. 144 (1970). 
39 In Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917. 921 (D. Mass. 
1973), the court noted the probable "working arrangement between repossessors and 
the police," in the context of repossessions under § 9-503 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. !d. 
411 See note 14 supra. 
41 Cf. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 161-174 (1970); Bouie v. City of 
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 365 (1964). 
42 One of the dissenting positions in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 
419 U.S. 601 (1975), called for limiting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 
(1969), according to its facts, to the conditions of "tremendous hardship" and "enor-
mous leverage." 419 U.S. at 615 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). If this variable standard were 
applied to the state action concept, it would have to be justified pragmatically rather 
than theoretically. See Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 122-23 (N.D. Cal 1970), quoted 
in Porter, at 5, pertaining to this standard as it relates to the due process issue. 
43 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1110-12 (3d Cir. 1974); Fletcher v. 
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Nat'! Bank, 496 F.2d 927, 931-33 (1st Cir. 1974); Shirley 
v. State Nat'! Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 741-45 (2d Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First 
Nat'! Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 329-38 (9th Cir. 1973); Bichel Optical Lab., Inc. v. Mar-
quette Nat'! Bank, 487 F.2d 906, 907 (8th Cir. 1973). For cases dealing with the rele-
vant question in terms of the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)-"under 
color" of law-see note 6 supra. 
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did not address this latter question, although it is clear that he did not 
feel bound by the extensive contrary federal authority on the meaning 
of state action in this context. 44 Aside from a cryptic reference to 
Reitman v. Mulkey 45 and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 46 at the 
close of the opinion, and narrow references to federal district court 
decisions of doubtful continued validity,47 the housing court failed to 
convincingly justify its holding on the state action question. 48 Thus, 
even if "right," the housing court's opinion is not persuasive. That a 
more persuasive case might have been made is even more dishearten-
ing. 
That more persuasive case was perhaps best expressed in Chief 
Judge Kaufman's dissenting opinion to the Second Circuit's decision 
in Shirley v. State National Bank: 49 
[O]ur system of laws is bedrocked in the principle that the State 
has a "monopoly over techniques for binding conflict resolution." 
Moreover, the decisive difference between "binding conflict reso-
lution," ... and "private structuring" ... is the element of volun-
tary, mutual consent .... Accordingly, where, as here, the creditor 
is empowered, whether by common law or by statute, to unilater-
ally resolve a conflict, he is acting within a sphere reserved for the 
state alone and, therefore, his power, like state power, must be 
fettered by the restraints of due process. 
Under the so-called "public function" test, then, self-help repos-
session is infused with the requisite "state action" because the 
creditor acts pursuant to a grant of the state's monopoly power to 
44 The housing court did not specify whether its holding is based solely on the United 
States Constitution. The statute was also attacked as violative of article I 0 of part I of 
the Massachusetts Constitution. The housing court's determination of the meaning of 
"state action" under the state constitution may immunize the decision from review by 
other than state tribunals. Clearly, reliance on the state constitution would constitute an 
adequate and independent state ground of decision. 
45 387 u.s. 369 (1967). 
46 365 u.s. 715 (1961). 
47 See Porter, at 5-10. See also note 35 supra. 
48 See Porter, at 5-10. The court's failure to d(aw support from the excellent dissent-
ing opinion of Chief Judge Kaufman in Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 
745-47 (2d Cir. 1974) is puzzling. See text at notes 49-50 infra. More disturbing, how-
ever, is that no effort was made to distinguish or explain the recent "retreats" on "state 
action" by the Supreme Court. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 
350-59 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-79 (1972). See also 
note 24 and accompanying text supra. The housing court's failure to distinguish jackson 
is most troubling because the facts there (termination of electric service without a prior 
hearing) are sufficiently close to require some response. See 419 U.S. at 347. For a dis-
tinction of Moose Lodge, see Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 747 n.9 (Kauf-
man, C.J., dissenting). jackson, is discussed further at note 62 infra. 
49 493 F.2d 739, 745-47 (2d Cir. 1974). See note 48 supra. 
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lawfully seize a significant property interest without the consent of 
the holder. 50 
The reference to the state's "monopoly over techniques for binding 
conflict resolution," central to Judge Kaufman's analysis, is derived 
from Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in Boddie v. Connecticut. 51 
Similar language is used in Fuentes to describe the limited conditions 
under which prejudgment property seizures may be tolerated.52 One 
of the conditions is that "the State has kept strict control over its 
monopoly of legitimate force."53 Although the housing court quoted 
this excerpt in its opinion, 54 it failed to discern the relationship of the 
excerpt to the state action argument. 55 
In the concluding portion of his dissenting opinion in Fuentes, 
Justice White left no doubt that he considered a relationship to exist 
between the decision and the state-action-private-action dichtomy: 
The Court's rhetoric is seductive, but in end analysis, the result 
it reaches will have little impact and represents no more than 
ideological tinkering with state law. It would appear that creditors 
could withstand attack under today's opinion simply by making clear 
in the controlling credit instruments that they may retake possession with-
out a hearing, or, for that matter, without resort to judicial process at 
all. 56 
The majority in Fuentes likewise leaves little doubt what its likely re-
sponse would be to that form of "private action" reflected in a con-
tractual waiver of a hearing. The Court strongly intimated that it 
would not countenance a contractual surrender of a right to a hearing 
50 !d. at 747. But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567-70 (1972). In Lloyd, the 
Court refused to extend the public function test to a shopping center with respect to 
handbilling and speech unrelated to the business purposes of the center's occupants. 
See note 23 supra. 
51 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971). The housing court's justification, unlike Judge 
Kaufman's justification, is unpersuasive because it bears no organic relationship to cog-
nate, evolving constitutional doctrine. Whatever one may think about the line drawn, 
the Supreme Court did distinguish the waiver of filing fees in divorce actions (Boddie) 
from a denial of waiver of such fees in bankruptcy proceedings, United States v. Kras, 
409 U.S. 434, 443-50 (1973), partly on the ground that the resolution of marital status, 
as compared to debt relief, was exclusively a state function. Judge Kaufman's analysis 
derives independent support from these Supreme Court cases for the proposition that 
the relevant question, in cases like Porter, is whether a nonconsensual transfer of private 
property is exclusively a state function. See Shirley, 493 F.2d at 745-47 (dissenting opin-
ion). If the housing court sensed that an affirmative answer to this question is inherent 
in Fuentes, its analysis of state action failed to explicate the foundation of its intuition. 
52 See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90-91 (1972). 
53 !d. at 91. 
54 Porter, at 7, quoting Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90-91. 
55 See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra. 
56 407 U.S. at 102 (White, J ., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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" 'where the contract is one of adhesion, where there is great disparity 
in bargaining power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the 
[waiver] provision.' "57 If there is no constitutional barrier to examin-
ing "private agreements" of "consent" to repossess or seize property, it 
is difficult to understand why an "unpermitted" repossession or sei-
zure might be treated differently.58 If the answer is that the taking is 
not "unpermitted," then it appears obvious that the state supplies the 
permission. Not even the dissenters in Fuentes and North Georgia deny 
this. On the contrary, the dissenters argue that the Court must respect 
the distributional choices the states have made respecting the conflic-
ting interests of the parties involved. 59 If their view is ultimately ac-
cepted, the validity of statutes such as section 23 of chapter 225 of the 
General Laws and section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code60 is 
more likely to be determined against the standards of equal protection 
and substantive due process, 61 than against standards of state action. 62 
At bottom, cases such as Porter concern the endless conflict between 
the courts and the legislatures over who finally decides a matter. 63 
The court in Davis, characterizing the question in property terms, was 
willing to defer to the legislative rule-making power.64 The court in 
57 Id. at 95, quoting D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972). The 
Court rested its response on very explicit dicta from the Overmyer case. There a "confes-
sion of judgment" provision was included in a contract negotiated by lawyers for two 
corporations and the Court noted that it was "not a case of unequal bargaining power 
or overreaching." ld. at 186. See also Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972). 
58 Nevertheless, the majority in Fuentes noted that "[t]he creditor could, of course, 
proceed without the use of state power, through self-help, by 'distraining' the property 
before a judgment." 407 U.S. at 79 n.12. It would be wrong to attach much significance 
to this possibly unguarded remark since it was made purely in the context of explaining 
a historical point respecting common law remedies. See id. 
59 See North Georgia, 419 U.S. at 619-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 
100, 103 (White, J., dissenting). Cf Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 68-69 (1972). 
60 G.L. c. 106. 
61 The equal protection argument would raise such questions as why tenants are not 
accorded like self-help remedies for exerting claims against their landlords, or more 
broadly, why extraordinary seizure remedies are granted certain classes of claimants 
only. The due process argument would be that certain categories of private property 
are being taken without the requisite showing of sufficient state interest. 
62 See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), which stands as the 
most compelling precedent for handling these questions in state action terms. Porter is 
distinguishable from Jackson, however, on the ground that the claimant in Porter has no 
interest in the property except as "remedial leverage" recognized by the statute. 
Furthermore, the discontinuance of service in Jackson constitutes a refusal to continue 
to transfer the property of the company (viz., electricity) until the dispute is resolved. 
Id. at 347. A court would have to make a significant substantive reformation of the 
meaning of property (based on need) to place Jackson on the same footing as Porter. 
Such judicial extensions of the meaning of property have been eschewed. See 
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). Cf Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). 
63 More accurately the "conflict" is between exponents of judicial activism and those 
of judicial restraint. 
64 "By granting the unpaid landlord a defeasible possessory right, the state merely 
adopts one possible resolution, acting not as participant but rulemaker." 512 F.2d at 204. 
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Porter viewed the problem as essentially one of dispute resolution; 
therefore, it insisted that the Legislature exceeds its power when it ef-
fectively foredoses review by the very institution that is impressed 
with the duty to resolve disputes on an individual and fair basis.65 As 
with most confrontations in the law, the most likely outcome will be 
relief of tension through indirect means. One consequence of pres-
sure for reform exerted by the judiciary has been legislative move-
ment in areas long considered fixed. The real virtue of judgments 
such as Porter may lie in the impact they will have on the Legislature. 
Laws, like men, do not necessarily command respect because they are 
old.66 
§12.3. Retroactivity of Supreme Court Holdings on Prejudgment 
Attachments. In Mcintyre v. Associates Financial Services Co., Inc., 1 the 
Supreme Judicial Court was asked to de<_:ide whether the require-
ments of due process established in Fuentes v. Shevin 2 should be ap-
plied retroactively to invalidate a real estate attachment made, without 
prior notice or an opportunity for a hearing, pursuant to sections 42 
and 62-66 of chapter 223 of the General Laws. 3 The attachment in 
Mcintyre was recorded on December 31, 1971, almost six months be-
fore the Fuentes decision was announced.4 
After a cursory review of the Supreme Court's controversial 
post-Fuentes decisions,5 the Supreme Judicial Court concluded, "with 
confidence," that the Fuentes case was viable. 6 Accordingly, the Court 
assumed that attachments of a debtor's real property, under the chal-
lenged provisions of chapter 223 of the General Laws, would be in-
valid under Fuentes. 7 Nevertheless, the Court did not decide the due 
process issues because it concluded that the Fuentes principles should 
not be applied retroactively. 8 The opinion proceeded to discuss the 
justification for treating the Fuentes case nonretroactively as if that de-
65 Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); 
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
66 As noted previously, rules of practice respecting attachment procedures, which 
trace their roots to English common law, were substantially modified in response to the 
Fuentes line of cases. See MAss. RULES OF C1v. PRoc. 4.1 and 4.2 (1974). See also § 12.2, 
note 15 supra. Cf G.L. c. 255, § 13J; c. 255B, § 20B; c. 255D, § 22. 
§12.3. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1490, 328 N.E.2d at 492. 
2 407 u.s. 67 (1972). 
3 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1493, 328 N.E.2d at 494. 
4 Id. at 1490, 328 N.E.2d at 493. • 
5 These Supreme Court decisions are discussed at length in § 12.1 supra. 
6 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1494, 328 N.E.2d at 494. 
7 ld. 
8 Id. at 1496, 328 N.E.2d at 495. 
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termination could be made independently of the rationale of the 
Fuentes decision. 9 
The Supreme Judicial Court adopted the test enunciated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson 10 to determine 
whether a "new rule" is to be retroactive: "(1) whether a new principle 
has been established whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed, 
(2) whether retroactive application will further the rule, and (3) 
whether inequitable results, or injustice or hardships, will be avoided 
by a holding of nonretroactivity."11 In applying this test to the Fuentes 
rule, the Court referred to the holding of nonretroactivity reached by 
the three-judge federal court in Higley Hill, Inc. v. Knight, 12 where 
Circuit Judge Campbell, speaking for the court, stated: 
The rule, as we have indicated, was not clearly foreshadowed. At-
tempted retrospective application will not further its operation; 
indeed the limited resources of state and federal courts are better 
directed towards securing compliance with the new rule in 
post-Fuentes cases than in unravelling mature and possibly ancient 
litigation commenced under former law. Finally, plaintiffs will be 
subjected to the automatic destruction of attachments needed to 
afford them reasonable security regardless of the merits of their 
claims. Undoing such preexisting arrangements would work sub-
stantial hardship on creditors who reasonably relied upon lawful 
Massachusetts procedures. Moreover, a mechanistically retroactive 
application might leave unsettled the title to real estate sold at ju-
dicial sales, and the status of judgments already secured. 13 
On its face, the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court appears un-
objectionable. Closer analysis, however, reveals that the Court's reso-
lution of the retroactivity issue fails to deal with several critical aspects 
of the problem presented. Indeed, the case is a paradigm of 
nonanalytical decision-making. 14 The opinion provides no analysis of 
"See id. at 1494-97, 328 N .E.2d at 494-95. 
10 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971). That case relied, in turn, on Linkletter v. Walder, 381 
U.S. 618, 628 (1965). 
11 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1495-96, 328 N.E.2d at 495. 
12 360 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1973). 
13 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1496-97, 328 N.E.2d at 495, quoting Higley Hill, 360 F. 
Supp. at 206. 
14 The actual facts of the case stretch incredulity further. The writ of attachment was 
instituted pursuant to an action in contract against the previous owners of the real es-
tate. The attachment was recorded in the registry of deeds two months before 
petitioner Mcintyre purchased the real estate. Therefore, Mcintyre had constructive 
notice of the attachment, and possibly actual knowledge, at the time of purchase. The 
Court noted these points when it questioned the standing of the petitioner to assert the 
due process claims. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1494-95, 328 N.E.2d at 494-95. Nonetheless, 
the Court pressed on to "decide" the "larger issues." See id. The Supreme Judicial Court 
may have considered the case an ideal vehicle to signal its views on the law without 
harming anyone's reliance interests. 
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what the rule in Fuentes is, a matter that admits of no easy answer. 15 
Furthermore, the opinion supplies no analysis and hardly any descrip-
tion of the real estate attachment procedures at issue-a consideration 
that is crucial to an assessment of their validity under Fuentes and its 
progeny. 16 The Court did not attempt to define the "new rule" for 
which retroactive application was sought, but nevertheless concluded 
that such undefined but existing "new rule" did not apply retroac-
tively to some unexamined statutory provisions. 
The absence of analysis in Mcintyre diminishes its value as prece-
dent, not only in matters pertaining to all manner of prejudgment 
remedies, but on the broader problem of retroactivity of constitutional 
decisions in general. Mcintyre will not prove helpful in the future for 
the very reasons that it does not enable us presently to better answer 
such questions as the following: 
(1) How does the court determine that the "cut-off date" for due 
process safeguards is the date of the Fuentes decision without first in-
quiring whether the state statutes violated due process standards that 
predated Fuentes? After all, Fuentes did not appear full grown from 
the head of Zeus. As Justice Stewart noted: 
The Fuentes decision was in a direct line of recent cases in this 
Court that have applied the procedural due process commands of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit governmental action that 
deprives a person of a statutory or contractual property interest 
15 See § 12.1 supra. 
16 Previous cases in the federal courts in Massachusetts have likewise treated "failure 
to provide prior notice or hearing opportunity" as dispositive of the denial of due pro-
cess claim. These cases, however, were all decided in the light of the broad standard 
adopted in Fuentes, and before the qualifications and limitations of Mitchell v. W.T. 
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem., Inc., 419 
U.S. 601 (1974). See Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741, 746 (D. Mass. 1972), 
declaring unconstitutional G.L. c. 246, § I et seq. (except § 32(8), which permitted pre-
judgment trustee attachments made at the unsupervised discretion of plaintiffs, without 
notice or hearing; Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Industries, 
Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299, 1306 (D. Mass. 1973), declaring G.L. c. 223, §§ 42, 62-66, 
which allowed prejudgment real estate attachments, without prior notice or hearing op-
portunity, unconstitutional. The court in Bay State Harness made a careful examination 
of the real estate attachment procedures at issue before concluding that lack of notice 
and prior hearing amounted to a fatal defect, 365 F. Supp. at 1303-06. 
See Higley Hill, Inc. v. Knight, 360 F. Supp. 203, 204-06 (D. Mass. 1973) in which doubt is 
also cast upon G.L. c. 223, § 62 (real estate attachments), G.L. c. 214, § 7 (trustee attach-
ments), and G.L. c. 215, § 6A (equitableattachments). 
Provisions referred to in Higley Hill relating to judicial supervision in ex parte prior 
hearings, and the postattachment dissolution hearings, suggest grounds for holding the 
provisions dealt with in that case valid under Mitchell and North Georgia. See 360 F. 
Supp. at 206-07. 
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with no advance notice or opportunity to be heard. 17 
(2) More specifically, without a careful examination of the operation 
of the real estate attachment provisions, how is the court certain that 
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 18 is not the more pertinent precedent? 
After all, if the claim giving rise to the attachment is unrelated to the 
real estate, the claimant-creditor, prior to the attachment under dis-
pute, has no property interest in the real estate. Moreover. the at-
tachment ma.y directly affect the right of the debtor to shelter. 19 
More pertinently perhaps, one is prompted to ask still another 
question: What is the predictive value of this decision with regard to 
post-Fuentes real estate or other prejudgment attachments? 
Property attachments and "trustee process" attachments are now 
subject to the new Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provide for notice and an opportunity for a prior hearing, except in 
unusual circumstances.20 Nonetheless, the question remains as to the 
17 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 635 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
The Supreme Judicial Court offered no explanation why it selected the decision date 
of Fuentes, rather than the date on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the 
Fuentes case as determinative. An explanation of this "timing matter," which goes to the 
issue of "foreshadowing," surely was called for since Mitchell arose on a possessory writ 
issued four months before the Court announced Fuentes and since Mitchell did not ad-
dress the question of retroactivity. 
18 395 u.s. 337 (1969). 
19 The existence of a homestead exemption may well be very relevant to this point. 
For a discussion of the nature of the property interest affected by a real property at-
tachment, see Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Industries, 
Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299, 1304-05 (D. Mass. 1973): Cf Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 
U.S. 600, 604 (1974), and the discussion thereof at§ 12.1 supra. 
20 See MAss. R. C1v. P. 4.1 & 4.2. Rule 4.1 provides in part: 
(c) . . . No property may be attached unless such attachment for a specified 
amount is approved by order of the court. Except as provided in subdivision (f) of 
this rule, the order of approval may be entered only after notice to the defendant 
and hearing and upon a finding by the court that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the plaintiff will recover judgment, including interest and costs, in an amount 
equal to or greater than the amount of the attachment over and above any liability 
insurance shown by the defendant to be available to satisfy the judgment. (f) ... 
An order approving attachment of property for a specific amount may be entered 
ex parte upon findings by the court that there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
plaintiff will recover judgment in an amount equal to or greater than the amount 
of the attachment ... and that either (i) the person of the defendant is not subject 
to the jurisdiction of the court in the action, or (ii) there is clear danger that the 
defendant if notified in advance of attachment of the property will convey it, re-
move it from the state or will conceal it, or (iii) there is immediate danger that the 
defendant will damage or destroy the property to be attached. 
MAss. R. CIV. P. 4.1(g) provides for the prompt dissolution or modification of ex parte 
attachments by the defendant. 
As originally drafted, MAss. R. C1v. P. 4.1 did not apply to attachments of real prop-
erty. The rule was amended June 27, 1974, to make its provisions applicable to all 
property. Since the rule did not become effective until July 1, 1974, the original provi-
sions excluding real property were never in effect. It is not clear first. why real prop-
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validity of attachments made between the date of the Fuentes decision, 
June 12, 1972, and the effective date of the new rules, July 1, 1974. 
Aside from judicial fiat, there is nothing in Mcintyre that confutes the 
arguments that the notice and prior hearing requirements should op-
erate only prospectively, that is, from the date of the first Mass-
achusetts judicial pronouncement on the subject, the date of the 
Mcintyre decision itself, or, if earlier, the effective date of the new 
procedural rules. 21 Such an argument would have especial cogency 
with respect to a plaintiff who followed the former attachment proce-
dures, relying upon both the Supreme Court decision in Mitchell and 
the deliberate deferral of the effective date of the new rules of proce-
dure. 
Undoubtedly, the inability to determine the validity of certain 
post-Fuentes prejudgment attachments is largely a consequence of the 
uncertainty engendered by the Supreme Court rulings in this area. 
Nevertheless, by treating judicial developments of "new rules" the 
same way it would treat a legislative new rule, the Supreme Judicial 
Court missed an opportunity to inject an element of certainty-an in-
terest the Court professed to serve in deciding on nonretroactivity in 
Mclntyre 22 -into a field where it is required.t3 
The Court's approach suffers by comparison with the manner in 
which the federal courts handled the question of the retroactivity of 
the Fuentes rule so as to maximize the certainty of prospective opera-
tion without unduly disturbing past transactions. In Higley Hill, 24 the 
federal district court said: 
We would make but one exception to non-retroactivity. We think 
that a pre-Fuentes defendant is Constitutionally entitled, in any 
erty was originally excluded, and second, why second thoughts resulted in a change 
three days before the rule was to take effect. 
The constitutionality of the new rules has not yet been determined. The "unusual cir-
.cumstances" in which ex parte attachments are allowed tracks the exceptions alluded to 
by the courts. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972). Exception (i) in Rule 4.1, 
respecting attachments made to attain jurisdiction, may present the most difficult ques-
tion. See Note; 82 YALE L.]. 1023, 1025 (1973). 
21 See note 16 supra. Query, whether federal court pronouncements have in this con-
text the same scope as an opinion by an appellate state court? The discussion of the use 
of the certified question procedure in Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding 
Ass'n v. PPG Industries, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299, 1302-03 (D. Mass. 1973) may be of in-
terest in this context. 
22 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1490, 1496, 328 N.E.2d 492, 495. 
23 The Court's apparent scruple is one of judicial power. Once the Court has deter-
mined that the new rule should not be applied retroactively, it relinquishes all power to 
pass on the validity of the challenged statute. Thus, the Court may be doing all it 
legitimately can to signal its projection of the law through dictum. This also could ex-
plain its desire to take the case notwithstanding its doubts concerning standing. See 
note 14 supra. 
24 360 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1973). 
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proceeding where his property remains attached, to a fully ade-
quate hearing upon request-if one has never been afforded-in 
which the reasonableness of the attachment is carefully deter-
mined de novo in light of the probable validity of the underlying 
claim .... We recognize that such a hearing would be inadequate 
to save a post-Fuentes attachment from Constitutional attack, as-
suming the attachment was obtained without notice and opportu-
nity for hearing. But it would afford to pre-Fuentes defendants the 
assurance of present fairness without penalizin§ plaintiffs for 
non-compliance with previously non-existent rules. 5 
Presumably, the Supreme Judicial Court in Mcintyre intended to 
recognize the same "exception to nonretroactivity." At the close of the 
opinion, the Court noted that "[ w ]e have no doubt that a debtor 
whose real estate was subjected to a pre-Fuentes attachment was enti-
tled on application to an expeditious judicial hearing to determine the 
reasonableness of the attachment."26 
This "exception to nonretroactivity," of course, is really nothing of 
the kind. Recognizing this, a different three-judge federal panel, in 
Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Association v. PPG Industries, 
Inc., 27 declined to follow their brethren in Higley Hill. 28 Instead the 
court in Bay State Harness concluded its opinion with the following 
statement on the scope of retroactivity: 
[W]e limit the effect of the judgment ordered today ( 1) to the 
parties in the cases at bar, including parties in cases not heard 
orally but who have participated as amici curiae in the proceedings 
before the court, and (2) to the enforcement of chapter 223, sec-
tions 42, 62-66 which are similarly constitutionally challenged in 
cases now pending before the district judges in the District, and 
(3) to the prospective enforcement of chapter 223, sections 42, 
62-66 insofar as these sections deny parties notice and opportu-
nity to be heard prior to the making of attachments of their real 
estate, from the time of the filing of the order entered herewith.29 
The reasons that support this approach to retroactivity-which 
treats all relevant pending litigation within the District as subject to 
the benefits of a new rule-also provide a sound rationale for dealing 
with analogous situations in the present and future. These reasons 
25 ld. at 206-07. 
28 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1497, 328 N.E.2d at 495. 
27 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973). 
28 ld. at 1307 n.7. "We note that anoth.er case in this District, Higley Hill ... declined 
to apply Fuentes retroactively to attachments made before June 12, 1972, the date 
Fuentes was decided. We declined to take such a narrow approach .... " Id. 
29 Id. at 1307 (footnote omitted). 
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were succinctly articulated in Gunter v. Merchants Warren National 
Bank:30 
Furthermore, to rule that Fuentes is purely prospective is to hold 
that if a Supreme Court ruling is so characterized, not only may 
litigants not benefit from its specific application, but courts may 
not rely on it as precedent for analogous situations where the 
event in suit antedated the ruling. This we feel would hamper the 
traditional process of common law adjudication without advancing 
the pragmatic purposes of [the] retroactivity doctrine. 31 
The statements in both Bay State Harness and Gunter reflect misgiv-
ings about the concept of nonretroactivity. The notion that a new rule 
can be given purely prospective effect is fundamentally inconsistent 
with the principle of judicial review. The power of courts to declare 
law ultimately is a function of their duty to decide cases.32 The judi-
cial process itself therefore depends on "a case at bar exception" to 
the nonretroactivity concept.33 The matter does not end here. The di-
lemma posed is how to make an exception for the party at bar and 
not make the same "exception" for those who have contempora-
neously challenged the same (or similar) rules of law. 34 
The Supreme Court opinions on retroactivity have hardly served to 
resolve the dilemma posed. On the contrary, the Court has all but 
apologized for the necessity of a "case at bar exception." In an extra-
ordinary inverse form of reasoning, the Court said: 
Inequity arguably results from according the benefit of a new rule 
to the parties in the case in which it is announced but not to other 
litigants similarly situated in the trial or appellate process who 
have raised the same issue. But we regard the fact that the parties 
involved are chance beneficiaries as an insignificant cost for 
adherence to sound principles of decision-making.35 
30 360 F. Supp. 1085 (S.D. Me. 1973). 
31 Id. at 1091-92 n.17. 
32 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
33 If it were otherwise, the vitality of decisional law would be lost. Without "retro-
active" application to the case at bar, why would a litigant ever challenge existing law? 
For a most telling judicial criticism of the current doctrine of prospectivity, see Justice 
Harlan's concurring opinion in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-702 (1971). 
See also Mishkin, The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability and Due Process: A Reply to Pro-
fessor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (1966); Comment, Prospective Overruling andRe-
troactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L. J. 907 ( 1962). . 
34 The implication of this analysis questions the observation in Linkletter v. Walker, 
381 U.S. 618, 628 (1965), that "there seems to be no impediment-constitutional or 
philosophical-to the use of [a prospective] rule in the constitutional area where the ex-
igencies of the situation require such an application." It is not clear why prospective 
rulemaking does not pose serious article III doubts, as suggested in the text at notes 
23-25 supra, if not equal protection questions. 
35 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967). 
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A sound argument can be made that the Supreme Court's recent 
pronouncements supporting the doctrine of prospectivity should be 
restricted to the criminal procedure cases that gave rise to the 
doctrine.36 But the better argument, however, is that made by Justice 
Harlan: "all 'new' rules of constitutional law must, at a minimum, be 
applied to all those cases which are still subject to direct review by this 
Court at the time the 'new' decision is handed down."37 According to 
this view, Mcintyre, being theoretically subject to review by the Su-
preme Court, should have been decided in the light of the evolving 
constitutional principles of Fuentes, insofar as the deciding court is 
capable of seeing that light. For to do otherwise, as Justice Harlan 
cautioned, is to reduce "all other courts in this country ... to the role 
of automatons," that no longer bear the "responsibility for developing 
or interpreting the Constitution."38 
§12.4. Official Inquiry into Off-Duty Conduct of Police 
Officers. The extent to which public employees must divulge infor-
mation relating to their off-duty conduct upon threat of dismissal was 
considered by the Supreme Judicial Court in Broderick v. Police Com-
missioner if Boston. 1 On Friday, May 10, 1974, approximately ninety 
off-duty Boston police officers travelled to Newport, Rhode Island, in 
order to participate in a Law Day celebration. The officers spent Fri-
36 In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 619-20 (1965), the Supreme Court refused 
to apply the rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), retroactively. Mapp held that 
evidence derived from an illegal search was inadmissable in a state prosecution. ld. at 
655. Linkletter held that the evidence exclusion rule of Mapp would not be applied to 
state court convictions that had become final before rendition of the Mapp opinion. 381 
U.S. at 640. The Court reasoned that the main purpose of the Mapp exclusionary rule 
was deterrence of illegal police action and that purpose would not be served by extend-
ing it to police misconduct that occurred prior to Mapp. Id. at 635-40. In a series of 
cases, this analysis was applied in various police misconduct contexts. Moreover, the 
nonretroactivity concept was extended to pending cases so long as the newly proscribed 
official misconduct occurred before establishment of the new rule. See, e.g., Williams v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Johnson v. 
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). 
It has been argued that cases, .such as the foregoing, are distinguishable, for purposes 
of the application of the retroactivity concept, from cases in which "new" rules are 
manifestations of "evolving legal principles" rather than of instrumental policies (e.g., 
deterring police misconduct). According to this distinction, cases based on "evolving 
principles," call for the ordinary operation of the retroactivity doctrine. Accordingly, 
cases like Fuentes, representing an extension of procedural due process, should be ap-
plied retroactively. See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: 
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L. J. 221, 255-57 (1973). 
In City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 207 (1970), the Court rejected a 
strict nonretroactivity approach even though the security of municipal bonds was 
thereby threatened. 
37 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,258 (1969) (Harlan,J., dissenting). 
38 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,680 (1971) (Harlan]., dissenting). 
§12.4. ' 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1838, 330 N.E.2d 199. 
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day evening at the Ramada Inn in Portsmouth; on Saturday they 
marched in a Law Day parade along with delegations from other 
communities. Following the weekend activities, the police commis-
sioner of the City of Boston received complaints regarding the offi-
cers' conduct both at the inn and at the parade. 2 
Pursuant to an investigation of these complaints, a questionnaire 
was distributed to those officers listed as being off-duty on the dates 
in question.3 The questionnaire "inquired generally as to whether the 
officer had been registered or present at the inn; whether the officer 
had witnessed any events thereat; and further asked specific questions 
relating to the activities at the parade."4 The plaintiff policemen5 un-
successfully sought declaratory and injunctive relief to determine 
whether they were under any legal duty to answer the questionnaire 
and to prohibit the commissioner from ordering them to respond to 
it. 6 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the questionnaire exceeded 
the scope of any constitutionally permissible inquiry since it inquired 
as to their off-duty, noncriminal conduct. 7 The plaintiffs further ar-
gued that the questionnaire violated their statutorily protected right 
of privacy.8 The Supreme Judicial Court rejected both of these con-
tentions, holding that the commissioner could require the policemen 
to submit written answers to the questionnaire without violating their 
constitutional or statutory rights. 9 
2 Id. at 1839-40, 330 N.E.2d at 200-01. The events leading to the complaints were 
summarized by the manager of the inn in an affidavit which alleged: 
that a customer at the inn, while playing pool in the bar area, had had his pool 
cue snatched away in the course of which he had been punched in the chest by a 
person subsequently identified by the manager as a Boston police officer; that the 
manager had observed "15 or 20 Police Officers at one point diving and playing in 
the pool in the nude, screaming and yelling like a bunch of wild kids"; that the 
manager had seen three nude males walking about in the vicinity of the pool area 
and the hotel lobby; that during the night a group of men roamed about the hall-
ways using foul and opprobrious language; that at one point during the night the 
manager was awakened by what he thought were gun shots which were in fact 
some form of fireworks; that sometime during the night the hotel liquor cabinet 
was broken into and five quarts of liquor were stolen; and that some guests had 
left the inn without paying for their breakfast. 
Id. at 1840, 330 N.E.2d at 201. 
3 Id. at 1841-42, 330 N.E.2d at 201. 
4 Id. at 1841, 330 N.E.2d at 201. 
5 Plaintiff Broderick was the chairman of the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association 
and the other plaintiffs were various officers of that organization. It was stipulated by 
the parties that a decision in the case would be binding as to all other patrolmen who 
were members of the association and who had received orders to answer the question-
naires. Id. at 1842 n.2, 330 N.E.2d at 202 n.2. 
6 I d. at 1842, 330 N.E.2d at 202. 
7 Id. at 1846, 330 N.E.2d at 203. 
8 /d. at 1843,330 N.E.2d at 202. See G.L. c. 214, §lB. 
9 Id. at 1844-50, 1855, 330 N.E.2d at 202-05, 206. 
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I 
The Court in Broderick failed to delineate which, if any, constitu-
tional rights were involved in determining the permissible scope of an 
inquiry into the actions of public employees. 10 I In Gardner v. 
Broderick, 11 the United States Supreme Court delimited the power of a 
public employer to dismiss a police officer for failing to answer ques-
tions "specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance 
of his official duties."12 The Supreme Judicial Court applied these 
standards to the questionnaire in Broderick, 13 but did pot make any at-
tempt to explain or discuss the underlying constitutional principles. 
Although the principles involved in this case were lt susceptible of 
precise explanation, the mere application of verbal formulas by the 
Supreme Judicial Court hardly serves as a substitute or an analysis of 
the interplay of the constitutional issues involved. 
The limitations imposed by Gardner on the scope of an inquiry by a 
public employer into the off-duty activities of publi~ employees ap-
pear to be derived from the due process rights of public employees. 
I 
10 The Court initially summarized th~ plaintiffs' constitutional cl~im as follows: "The 
legal grounds urged by the plaintiffs are that the questionnaire inquired as to 'off-duty 
non-criminal conduct' and was therefore violative of rights guaranteed by our State and 
Federal Constitutions ... . "/d. at 1843, 330 N.E.2d at 202. I 
Subsequently, the Court stated that the constitutional issue pre~ented was "whether 
the substance of the inquiry bears a rational connection either specifically to the 
officer's direct performance of official acts, or generally to the officer's fitness and abil-
ity to serve in governmental service." /d. at 1844, 330 N.E.2d at 202. Although this lan-
guage suggests a due process analysis, the Court does not men~on due process ex-
pressly. See text at notes 14-18 infra. ! 
11 392 u.s. 273 (1968). 
12 /d. at 278-79 . .In Gardner, a New York City patrolman was called to testify before a 
grand jury investigating alleged criminal conduct. He was advx"sed of his privilege 
against self-incrimination but was asked to sign a waiver of imm nity after being told 
that he would be dismissed if he did not sign. The Court overtur ed the dismissal be-
cause it was based not upon his "failure to answer relevant questions about his official 
duties," but upon ''his refusal to waive the immunity to which he is entitled if he is re-
quired to testify despite his constitutional privilege." /d. See also Ifniformed Sanitation 
Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968). But! see Spevack v. Klein, 
385 u.s. 511 (1967). 
The right of immunity under ·these circumstances was established in Garrity v. New 
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), where the Court held that where aJpoliceman had been 
compelled to testify by threat of removal from office for failure to estify, any testimony 
that he gave could not be used against him in a subsequent crimi al prosecution. !d. at 
500. 
13 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1843 n.3, 330 N.E.2d at 203 n.3. The questionnaire in 
Broderick conformed to the requirements of Garrity v. New Jersey,l385 U.S. 493 (1967), 
and of Gardner in that it expressly provided that any information related by an officer 
concerning the incident under investigation would not be used aga nst him in a criminal 
proceeding. For these reasons, the Court concluded that no self-incrimination question 
was presented in the instant c,ase. /d. 
1 
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The exact nature and extent of these rights are not readily defined.14 
Although an individual may not have a right to public employment in 
the absolute sense, he clearly has a constitutionally protected interest 
in such employment, and he may not be subjected to unreasonable 
conditions. 15 As the Supreme Court noted in an earlier case: "To state 
that a person does not have a constitutional right to government em-
ployment is only to say that he must comply with reasonable, lawful, 
and nondiscriminatory terms laid down by the proper authorities."16 
The due process rights of public employees can be viewed as a 
corollary of the limits on the power of public authority.H In general, 
although the government may not be required to do a particular act, 
once it commences to do that act, it must do so in a way that is not 
arbitrary or unreasonable. Public employment, by definition govern-
mental activity, therefore is subject to the requirements of due pro-
cess. 
In the case of a private employer, the same constraints are not yet 
present: 
While a private employer may have the right, in the absence of 
statute or contract, to refuse to hire an individual for personal 
14 One of the troubling aspects of defining these rights is whether the rights are sub-
stantive or procedural. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the intimate 
relationship of these concepts is exposed. In that case, a university teacher, without 
tenure, sued to require his employer to state reasons for nonrenewal of his contract and 
to afford him a hearing. The Court found that he did not have a "legitimate claim of 
entitlement." If he had had such "entitlement," presumably the Court would have rec-
ognized his right to a hearing. Thus, even the right to be heard, a procedural due pro-
cess right, depends upon the preliminary determination of "entitlement" -a substantive 
due process concept. Cf Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See generally Van Al-
styne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 
1439, 1460-64 (1968) [hereinafter ·cited as Van Alstyne]. Cf Slochower v. Board of 
Education, 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956); Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58, 63-64 (D. 
Md. 1970). 
15 See Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-48 (1974); Picker-
ing v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 573-74 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 
385 U.S. 589, 604, 605-10 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1960); 
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551, 555-59 (1956). Cf Konigsberg 
v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 269-74 (1957); Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 
294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1961); Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58, 63-65 (D. 
Md. 1970); See also Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 1460-64. 
16 Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956). For many years, the 
prevailing judicial philosophy on the constitutional rights of public employees was re-
flected by the statement of Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor and Aldermen of 
New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), to the effect that a police officer 
"may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be 
a policeman." /d. at 220, 29 N .E. at 517. This view was predicated upon the belief that 
public employment was a privilege rather than a right. See Van Alstyne, supra note 14, 
at 1439-45; Note, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 409 ( 1968). This view is no longer recognized. 
See cases collected in note 15 supra. 
17 See cases cited in note 15 supra. 
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reasons, unrelated to job function, such as length of hair or per-
sonal dislike, an individual's interest in government employment is 
recognized as entitled to constitutional protection. 18 
The basis for this distinction rests upon the fourteenth amendment, 
which by its terms makes state action subject to due process 
safeguards while leaving purely private action beyond its scope. 19 
Moreover, the fourteenth amendment does not provide for a relax-
ation of the due process requirement when the state is acting in a 
proprietary rather than a governmental capacity.20 This distinction be-
tween public and private employment for constitutional purposes is 
further supported by public policy considerations. Inasmuch as the 
federal, state, and local governments either directly or indirectly con-
trol such a vast portion of the nation's employment, stricter controls 
upon the arbitrary exercise of power are required in the public sector 
than in the private sector. 21 
In Broderick, the plaintiffs argued that the questionnaire did not 
comply with the standards set forth in the Gardner case since the ques-
tions "sought to inquire as to off-duty conduct of the officers while in 
Rhode Island" and therefore did not specifically, directly, and nar-
rowly relate to the performance of official duties. 22 In applying the 
Gardner standard to the facts before it, the Supreme Judicial Court 
found it unnecessary to base its decision on the on-duty-versus-off-
duty dichotomy since the plaintiffs had engaged in the conduct at 
issue under the color of official authority.23 Nonetheless, the Court 
made it clear that even if the investigation were viewed as concerning 
conduct "more private than official," the inquiry would have been 
permissible. 24 The Court noted that it did not read Gardner as limiting 
the scope of a permissible inquiry merely to those actions occurring 
while on duty: 
18 Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58, 64 (D. Md. 1970). 
19 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & 
Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
20 Van Alstyne, supra note 14; at 1462. 
21 Id. at 1461-62. As Professor Van Alstyne states: 
This substantial influence which expanded governmental actlVlty gives the gov-
ernment over the private lives of its citizenry makes the restraints of substantive 
due process necessary. Indeed, a failure to demand substantive due process of gov-
ernment even as it expands would be a constitutional incongruity against the 
emerging trend to bring [private] decision makers within the constitution when the 
impact of their enterprises becomes so great that the power they wield is function-
ally equivalent to that traditionally exercised only by government. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
22 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1846, 330 N.E.2d at 203. 
23 The Court cited numerous factors in support of this conclusion. Id. at 1848-49, 330 
N.E.2d at 204. 
24 Id. at 1849, 330 N.E.2d at 204. 
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The crucial phrase in the Gardner quotation is "relating to the per-
formance of his official duties" (emphasis supplied). "Relating to" 
implies more than matters taking place on duty; we think it ex-
tends to matters of and concerning an individual's fitness for public 
service. We decline to hold that the commissioner must close his 
eyes to what might constitute outrageous, even illegal, conduct on 
the part of police officers under his command on the principle 
that the conduct took place while the officer was off duty. 25 
The Court also summarily rejected the plaintiffs' privacy claim on the 
basis that this right was forfeited by public display. 26 
Cases such as Broderick are in the process of evolving the legitimate 
standards of behavior of public officials. In Broderick, an element of 
public control would seem to be warranted because the conduct at 
issue was open and notorious, and directly reflected discredit on the 
police force. Had the conduct at issue been more private, or had the 
public employees involved held positions not as dependent upon the 
public trust and confidence as that of a police officer, the result might 
well have been different. Thus, while the Court's reasoning in 
Broderick with respect to the on-duty-versus-off-duty dichotomy ap-
pears to be correct, the problem of defining the permissible scope of 
any inquiry into off-duty conduct remains a difficult one. As the court 
in Broderick acknowledged, the breadth of any inquiry relating to pri-
vate conduct should be narrower than that permitted with respect to 
official conduct, and the public employer should have the burden of 
demonstrating that a rational nexus exists between any allegedly im-
proper conduct and the performance of official dutiesP The mere 
fact that a public employee engages in certain conduct that the public 
employer might deem to be either socially or morally "unacceptable" 
should not suffice to trigger an inquiry into essentially private 
conduct. 28 
25 /d. at 1847, 330 N.E.2d at 204. See also Mayor of Medford v. Judge of Dist. Court, 
249 Mass. 465, 470, 144 N.E. 397, 398 (1924), where the court stated: "The circum-
stance that this testimony related to a time when the officer was not in uniform and was 
not on duty is not decisive. His conduct while off duty and in civilian clothes might be 
of such nature as to show him unfit to act as a police officer." /d. 
26 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1854-55, 330 N.E.2d at 204-05, citing Wishart v. McDonald, 
500 F.2d 110, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1974). 
27 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1849-52, 330 N.E.2d at 204-05. 
28 Compare Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (petitioner dismissed from 
federal civil service as result of homosexual act on off-duty time, and admission of prior 
homosexual acts as young man; reinstatement ordered); Gayer v. Laird, 332 F. Supp. 
169 (D.D.C. 1971) (detailed questions concerning homosexual conduct were an invasion 
of privacy even though questions were asked in connection with granting of security 
clearance); Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58 (D. Md. 1970) (activities of applicant 
to police department in belonging to nudist camp not sufficiently violative of 
municipality's interest); Mindel v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 
(N.D. Cal. 1970) (postal clerk could not be discharged from public employment because 
27
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§12.5. Anonymous Publication of Election-Related Material. In 
Commonwealth v. Dennis, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court held unconstitu-
tionally overbroad2 section 41 of chapter 56 of the General Laws, 
which prohibits the writing, printing, posting, or distribution of circu-
lars or posters designed to aid or defeat any candidate for nomination 
or election to any public office, or any question submitted to the vot-
ers, unless such publication includes "either the names of the chair-
man and secretary, or of two officers, of the political or other organi-
zation issuing the same, or of some voter who is responsible therefor 
•••• " 3 The defendant in Dennis was charged with violating section 41 
after he printed and distributed a political circular critical of incum-
bent Saugus selectmen who were candidates for reelection. Neither 
the defendant's name nor address, nor that of any other person or 
organization responsible for the publication, appeared in the circular. 4 
Prior to the trial, the defendant unsuccessfully moved to have the 
complaint dismissed on both federal and state constitutional grounds.5 
Convicted and sentenced to three months in the house of correction, 
he appealed alleging error in the Superior Court's denial of the mo-
tion to dismiss. 6 On its own initiative/ the Supreme Judicial Court or-
dered direct appellate review and subsequently sustained defendant's 
exception to the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss on con-
stitutional grounds. 8 
The Supreme Judicial Court found that the statute imposed "an 
unconstitutional prior restraint on a nonvoter's exercise of First 
Amendment rights by requiring him to obtain the assent of a voter 
he was living with a woman to whom he was not married); with Riley v. Board of Police 
Comm'rs, 147 Conn. 113, 157 A.2d 590 (1960) (courting of sixteen-year-old girl by 
forty-year-old married police officer held sufficient to warrant dismissal); Mayor of 
Medford v. Judge of Dist. Court, 249 Mass. 465, 144 N.E. 397 (1924) (dismissal of 
police officer for improper relations with a woman not the officer's wife upheld). 
§12.5. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1924, 329 N.E.2d 706. 
2 /d. at 1927,329 N.E.2d at 708. 
3 G.L. c. 56, § 41. 
4 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh .. at 1925, 329 N.E.2d at 707. The circular was entitled the 
"Saugus News Enquirer." Ownership was attributed to the Association of Concerned 
Taxpayers, Box 54, Saugus, Massachusetts, a fictitious name and mailing address. /d. 
5 !d. at 1925-26, 329 N.E.2d at 707. Specifically, he argued that§ 41 violated the first 
and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States and· article sixteen 
of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Mass-
achusetts. !d. 
6 !d. 
7 /d. at 1924, 329 N.E.2d at 706. 
8 !d. at 1926-29, 329 N.E.2d at 707-08. 
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before publishing election literature."9 The Court's holding was predi-
cated upon the fact that although section 41 ostensibly applied to 
nonvoters, it made no provision for an attribution on any election-
related publication by a nonvoter. 10 A nonvoter wishing to circulate 
such a publication in conformity with section 41 would be required to 
find a voter willing to sponsor it. 11 The Court therefore concluded 
that section 41 overbroadly restricted the free expressiOn of 
nonvoters. 12 
Although the record did not indicate whether the defendant was a 
nonvoter, the Court, giving effect to the relaxed standing require-
ments that have developed in the first amendment area, found that 
Dennis was entitled to argue the statute's overbreadth. 13 Dennis, the 
Court noted, would have standing even if it were demonstrated that 
he was in fact a registered voter or that his misrepresentation con-
cerning the actual source of his publication could otherwise have been 
proscribed by the state without violating the first amendment. 14 
The Court went on to note that although the problem of over-
breadth might be circumvented by construing the statute as being ap-
plicable only to voters, such a construction would run afoul of the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by creating an 
arbitrary classification between voters and nonvoters. 15 Since no 
rational purpose is served by a distinction whereby voters would be 
required to identify their campaign literature whereas nonvoters 
would be free to express themselves anonymously, the Court con-
cluded that it was not able to correct the statutory defect of over-
9 Id. at 1927, 329 N.E.2d at 707. The Court in Dennis added in a footnote that the 
statute could not be read as permitting a nonvoter to satisfy the mandates of the statute 
by disclosing his own name and residence. /d. at 1927-28 n.3, 329 N.E.2d at 707-08 n.3. 
Moreover, the absence of a requirement that the nonvoter's name appear on the pub-
lication with that of the voter undermines the statute's ostensible purpose of revealing 
the true source of campaign-related literature, and would even seem to permit, if not 
encourage, misrepresentation by a nonvoter as to the publication's true source. /d. at 
1926-27, 329 N.E.2d at 707. 
10 See id. at 1926-27, 329 N .E.2d at 707-08. See also G.L. c. 56, § 41. 
11 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1926-27, 329 N.E.2d at 707. 
12 /d. A statute essentially the same as G.L. c. 56, § 41 was held unconstitutional on 
similar grounds in Canon v. Justice Court for the Lake Valley Judicial Dist., 39 Cal. 
Rptr. 228, 61 Cal. 2d 446, 393 P.2d 428, 429 ( 1964). 
13 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1927, 329 N.E.2d at 708. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 612 (1973), where the Supreme Court stated that: 
Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own 
rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or as-
sumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to 
refrain from constitutionally protected free speech or expression. 
Quoted in Dennis, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1928, 329 N.E.2d at 708. 
14 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1927, 329 N.E.2d at 708. 
15 See id. at 1928-29, 329 N.E.2d at 708. 
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breadth by statutory construction without violating the defendant's 
fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection under the law. 16 
The Court observed that the statute's apparent overbreadth could 
be corrected by new legislation, 17 but suggested "that there are sig-
nificant First Amendment problems with any statute which requires 
the author of a publication to reveal his identity."18 In Talley v. 
California, 19 the United States Supreme Court struck down an ordi-
nance that prohibited the distribution of all anonymous handbills on 
the grounds that such a proscription was overly broad.20 The Su-
preme Court, however, left open the question whether the state might 
constitutionally enact narrowly drafted disclosure laws aimed at fore-
stalling particular evils.21 
Since the decision in Talley, the lower courts have differed as to 
whether general disclosure legislation relating only to elections com-
ports with first amendment strictures.22 The state, of course, must 
show a compelling interest that cannot be furthered by less restrictive 
means in order to justify a restraint on protected speech. 23 One of the 
interests commonly advanced in support of election-related disclosure 
requirements is that such requirements enable the recipient of infor-
mation to assess the content of a _publication in light of its source.24 
The Court in Dennis summarily rejected this rationale as a justification 
for prohibiting all anonymous campaign literature,25 and went on to 
state that any total proscription of anonymous literature, regardless of 
its content, would violate the principles of Talley. 26 The Court left 
open the question whether more narrowly drafted legislation, requir-
ing disclosure of material that is critical of a candidate or ballot issue, 
might withstand constitutional attack.27 
16 /d. 
17 /d. at 1929, 329 N.E.2d at 708. 
18 !d. 
19 362 u.s. 60 (1960). 
20 !d. at 63-64. 
21 See id. at 64-66. 
22 Compare Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), vacated on other 
grounds sub. nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969); and People v. Duryea, 76 
Misc.. 2d 948, ajj'd 44 App. 2d 633 (N.Y. 1974) (both holding unconstitutional statutes 
similar to G.L. c. 56, § 41); with United States v. Insco, 365 F. Supp. 1308 (M.D. Fla. 
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 496 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1974), and United States v. Scott, 
195 F. Supp. 440 (D.N.D. 1961) (both upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 
612 (1970), which proscribes the publication or dissemination of anonymous written 
campaign materials in federal elections). 
23 See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 
(1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 
463 (1958). 
24 See Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1111, 1288-89 ( 1975). 
25 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1931, 329 N.E.2d at 709. 
26 !d. at 1931-32, 329 N.E.2d at 709. 
27 See id. 
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The purpose behind disclosure legislation of this nature would be 
to eliminate fraudulent and deceptive campaign literature. This serves 
an undeniably valid, and arguably compelling, public interest, and one 
that has been amplified by the incidence of "dirty tricks" during the 
1972 presidential campaign. However, it is unlikely that a disclosure 
requirement would serve to achieve the desired result of eliminating 
such tactics. An individual or organization intending to issue fraudu-
lent material is not likely to identify the true source of the publication. 
The activity that should be punished is not the failure to disclose, but 
rather the promulgation of the fraudulent material itself. This pur-
pose is served through the enactment of more narrowly drafted legis-
lation that proscribes fraudulent statements or false attributions in 
election related material.28 Such a statute would better achieve the de-
sired result without imposing a selective chill on all campaign-related 
publications, and as such, represents a less drastic alternative to a dis-
closure requirement. 
§ 12.6. Requirement of Parental Consent to Minor's Abortion. In 
Baird v. Bellotti, 1 a three-judge district court, in a 2-1 decision, held 
that the parental consent requirement of the 1974 Massachusetts stat-
ute governing abortions for minors2 was unconstitutional on its face. 3 
28 See 18 U.S.C. § 617 (1975 Supp. 1), the recently enacted federal campaign falsity 
statute, and Developments in the Law-Elections, supra note 24, at 1289 n.318. 
§12.6. 1 393 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1975). The plaintiffs in Baird were Mary Moe (a 
fictitious name), an unmarried sixteen-year-old girl who was eight weeks pregnant at 
the time the action was commenced; the Parents Aid Society Inc., a nonprofit corpora-
tion that provides abortions for varying fees, depending upon the mother's ability to 
pay; William Baird, founder and diree,tor of Parents Aid; and Dr. Gerald Zupnick, 
medical director of Parents Aid. 
Mary Moe subsequently had an abortion, performed by Dr. Zupnick, following the is-
suance of a restraining order in the case suspending operation of the statute. 393 F. 
Supp. at 850 n.4. That fact did not moot the case as to her. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 125 (1973). 
The court found that plaintiffs Mary Moe, Parents Aid, and Dr. Zupnick had stand-
ing as representative party plaintiffs and certified the suit as a valid class action as to all 
of them. 393 F. Supp. at 850-52. Although the court found Baird's standing more prob-
lematical, it did not pass on that question in light of the other plaintiffs' standing. !d. at 
851. The court also rejected the defendants' contention that no "case or controversy" 
existed inasmuch as none of the plaintiffs had been actually threatened with criminal 
prosecution. The court found a cognizable case or controversy because, under all the 
circumstances, "plaintiffs had every reason to believe that they had only two alterna-
tives, to continue their current activities and face immediate arrest, or to bring the 
present suit." !d. at 852. 
2 G.L. c. 112, § 12P, inserted by Acts of 1974, c. 706, § 1, which reads in part: 
If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent 
of both the mother and her parents is required. If one or both of the mother's 
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a judge of the 
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. 
Such a hearing will not require the appointment of a guardian for the mother. 
Section 12P was part of a newly enacted, comprehensive statutory scheme regulating 
abortions. See generally G.L. c. 112, §§ 121-12R. 
3 393 F. Supp. at 857. 
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The court broadly enjoined enforcement of section 12P of. chapter 
112 of the General Laws, which makes it a criminal offense to per-
form an abortion upon a minor without the consent of both parents 
as well as that of the minor, with certain exceptions. 4 The defendants5 
and the intervenor6 appealed, and the United States Supreme Court 
has noted probable jurisdiction. 7 
The validity of parental consent requirements had been expressly 
left unanswered by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 
the case that defined the constitutional rights of a woman to have an 
abortion without interference by the state. 8 The Baird opinion pre-
sented two issues that went beyond the scope of the decision in Roe v. 
Wade: (1) whether the rights of a minor female are coextensive with 
those of an adult,9 and (2) whether the minor's personal rights are 
paramount to the interests either of the state or of her parents. 10 The 
court in Baird answered both questions affirmatively.U 
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that there is a constitution-
ally protected right of privacy that is "broad enough to encompass a 
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy,"12 and 
that at least during the first trimester of pregnancy, the abortion deci-
sion must be left to the woman, in consultation with her physician, 
without interference by the state. 13 Although the constitutional rights 
4 /d. 
5 The defendants in Baird were Francis Bellotti, Attorney General of the Common-
wealth; Garrett Byrne, district attorney for Suffolk County; and the district attorneys of 
all other counties in the Commonwealth. /d. at 849. 
6 Jane Hunerwadel was permitted to intervene "on behalf of, and as representative 
of, Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor daughters who are, or who might, 
become pregnant." Id. at 849-50. 
7 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in Bellotti v. Baird, 44 U.S.L.W. 
3304 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1975) (No. 75-73), and Hunerwadel v. Baird, 44 U.S.L.W. 3304 
(U.S. Nov. 18, 1975) (No. 75-109), and consolidated both cases for hearing. These cases 
are to be argued together with Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 44 
U.S.L.W. 3304 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1975) (No. 74-1151), and Danforth v. Planned Parent-
hood of Central Missouri, 44 U.S.L.W. 3304 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1975), appeals from the de-
cision in Planned Parenthood uf Central Missouri v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. 
Mo. 1975), enforcement stayed, 420 U.S. 918 (1975). 
8 See 410 U.S. 113, 165 n.67 (1973). For a discussion of Roe v. Wade, see Comment, 
1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 10.8, at 235. 
9 393 F. Supp. at 855-56. 
10 /d. at 856-57. 
11 /d. A majority of the courts that have considered similar statutes have reached the 
same result. See Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973), appeal dismissed, 417 
U.S. 279 (1974); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973); Jones v. Smith, 
278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974); State v. Koome, 84 
Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975). But see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. 
Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975), enforcement stayed, 420 U.S. 918 (1975). See also Note, The 
Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA. L. REV. 305 
(1974). 
12 410 U.S. at 153. 
13 Id. at 163-64. 
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of minors have not as yet been clearly delineated, 14 the court in Baird 
readily concluded that "there can be no doubt but that a female's con-
stitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not depend 
upon her calendar age."15 
The question remained, however, whether the child's rights could 
be made subordinate to interests of the state-for reasons not pres-
ent in Roe v. Wade- or to those of her parents. 16 The state has tradi-
tionally promulgated reasonable regulations to protect minors, even 
when the minors or their parents have objected to the legislative 
enactments. 17 The court in Baird, however, concluded that the minor's 
right to have an abortion during the first trimester could not "be sub-
ordinated to the state any more than can be an adult's."18 This con-
clusion rested upon the court's interpretation of the challenged 
statutory provisions. The court took the view that "the statute is cast 
not in terms of protecting the minor ... but in recognizing indepen-
14 Most of the case law dealing with the rights of minors has arisen in the context of 
either the juvenile court system or the schools. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 . 
U.S. 528 (1971) (state need not provide juveniles with jury trials in the adjudicative 
phase of delinquency proceedings); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 ( 1970) (state must meet 
standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" in juvenile proceedings); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding child's 
right to wear armband in protest of Vietnam war); West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (upholding child's right to remain silent during pledge of 
allegiance). 
In In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967), the Supreme Court, although recognizing the 
juvenile's right to various procedural safeguards during the course of juvenile court 
proceedings, nevertheless made it clear that minors need not be accorded the full 
panoply of constitutional rights coextensive in kind and degree with those accorded an 
adult. !d. at 13. Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) with McKeiver v. Pennsyl-
vania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet considered the minor's right to privacy, 
lower courts have found it to exist. See, e.g., Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 
(E.D. Pa. 1973), where the court held that school questionnaires, designed to identify 
eighth-grade students with propensities for drug abuse so that preventive measures 
could be taken, were unconstitutional and constituted an invasion of the children's right 
to privacy. !d. at 920-22. 
15 393 F. Supp. at 855-56. The court also rejected the defendants' argument that 
females under the age of 18 generally lacked the capacity to make an informed and in-
telligent consent. !d. at 854-55. 
16 !d. at 856. 
17 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), involved a challenge to the state child 
labor law, where the Court rejected the claim of a child to freely practice her religious 
convictions by distributing religious literature on the streets and that of the child's 
guardian to be free to direct the child's upbringing without interference by the state. !d. 
at 164-70. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Supreme Court, in up-
holding an obscenity law adjusting the definition of obscenity for materials sold to per-
sons under 17 years of age, declined to accept the argument that it was impermissible 
to make a citizen's freedom to read or see material concerned with sex depend solely on 
his age. !d. at 639-41. 
18 393 F. Supp. at 856. 
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dent rights of parents." 19 The court stated that: 
The statute does not purport simply to provide a check on the 
validity of the minor's consent and the wisdom of her decision 
from the standpoint of her interests alone. Rather, it recognized 
and provides rights in both parents, independent of, and hence 
potentially at variance with, her own personal interests. 20 
The fact that the statute afforded the minor the opportunity of judi-
cial review of her parents' refusal of consent "for good cause shown" 
did not alter this view. The m~ority opinion took the position that 
such judicial review would merely insure that the refusal of consent 
be reasonably made in the interests of the parents. 21 The majority re-
jected the view expressed in the dissent that a reviewing superior 
court judge would consider only the interests of the minor. 22 
In assessing the competing interests of the parents and the minor, 
the court weighed many of the practical considerations bearing on the 
issue. 23 The court recognized the physiological and emotional risks 
surrounding an abortion, and noted that "parental support, if forth-
coming, is most desirable."24 While acknowledging that most parents 
are supportive, the court nevertheless felt constrained to find that 
many are not, for a variety of reasons, including the belief of some 
parents that abortion is "morally impermissible."25 Reflecting the view 
that the interests of the minor and her parents are not necessarily 
consonant, the court noted that 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 855. Although it is possible that the United States Supreme Court could con-
strue the parental consent requirement as merely affording protection to the minor, on 
behalf of the state, it is doubtful that the Court would adopt such an approach where 
the state has acknowledged that the statute is intended to recognize the competing in-
terests of the parents themselves. 
The federal court reserved judgment on whether the state could constitutionally reg-
ulate the minor's right to an abortion to a greater extent than an adult's exercise of that 
right, provided that the statute was cast in terms of affording additional protection by 
the state to the minor, rather than of recognizing independent rights of the parents. 
Id. For example, in order to provide a safeguard to the validity of the minor's consent 
and the wisdom of her decision, the state might require a confidential hearing, at which 
time the judge could satisfy himself that the minor was attended by a licensed physi-
cian, had been fully informed of the consequences surrounding the decision to abort, 
and was capable of making an informed consent. 
The court, however, left no doubt about the futility of the existing scheme, even in 
terms of the parents' interests: "[Parents] have years in which to teach their children, 
counsel them, guide them. We may wonder how much would be accomplished by com-
pulsorily affording a parent an eleventh hour opportunity, if adequate communication 
had not been established before." Id. at 856. 
21 393 F. Supp. at 855. 
22 Compare id. at 855 n. 10 with id. at 857-64 (dissenting opinion). 
23 I d. at 852-54. 
24 !d. at 853. 
25 !d. at 854. 
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some parents believe that they have separate rights as parents, 
and that there is a family interest, separate and apart from that of 
the minor. These interests, which are ass·erted to be of constitu-
tional proportions, they variously describe as "parents' liberties;" 
the parents' right to "promote and preserve the family as an im-
portant societal unit." These rights being, by hypothesis, antitheti-
cal to the minor's, it may not be unnatural for the minor to feel 
that she is in trouble enough without having to become subser-
vient to claims of others. 26 
The court found that a significant number of minors, though inde-
pendently reaching a reasonable decision about abortion, would be 
unwilling to inform their parents either out of fear of being forced 
into an unwanted marriage as punishment, or merely out of a desire 
to spare their parents any anxiety. 27 Finally, in drawing the balance, 
the court noted that it is the minor, not the parents, who will bear the 
child and be responsible for it, both financially and otherwise. 28 For 
these reasons, the court concluded that "even if it should be found 
that parents have rights vis-a-vis their child that are separate from the 
child's, we would find that in the present area the individual rights of 
the minor outweigh the rights of the parents, and must be 
protected."29 
The dissent maintained that parents have constitutionally protected 
rights that flow from the family relationship30 and that the statutory 
26 /d. 
27 !d. at 853. 
28 /d. at 856. 
29 !d. at 857. Although the court in Baird did not consider the issue, the provisions of 
G.L. c. 112, § 12P, could be subject to attack on equal protection grounds as well. The 
statutory provisions by their terms only apply to unmarried minors. This raises an equal 
protection question because married minors presumably are free to have. an abortion 
during the first trimester without any interference, by the state, their parents, or their 
husbands. In Doe v. Doe, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1089, 314 N.E.2d 128 (1974), the Su-
preme Judicial Court held that a husband has no enforceable right to prevent his wife 
from having an abortion. See Comment, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 10.8, at 234,235. 
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Supreme Court rejected an attempted 
statutory classification based upon the marital status of persons seeking contraceptive 
devices. !d. at 446-55. Against this argument, it should be noted that the marriage of 
minors requires parental consent. G.L. c. 207, § 7. 
30 393 F. Supp. 847, 857, 861-64. The dissent described the nature of the parents' in-
terest in part as follows: 
The State parental consent statute protects an interest which is completely separate 
from the State's interest in the protection of the pregnant woman's health or the 
unborn child's life. The statute protects the right of the parents to the liberty 
guaranteed them by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The statute protects 
the family relationship, the right and duty of parents to bring up their child, the 
right and duty of parents to inculcate moral standards; the statute provides protec-
tion for the parents' right and duty to make reasonable decisions, in the first in-
stance, for the control and functioning of the family as a harmonious unit. The 
statute ensures that parents will have the opportunity to guide and counsel their 
daughter, and play a supportive role during and after the pregnancy. 
/d. at 862. 
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guaranty of those rights serves a compelling state interest.31 The dis-
sent relied on cases such as Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 32 Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 33 and Wisconsin v. Yoder34 to support its view that parents 
have rights in their own behalf. In each of these cases, however, the 
Court merely established the rights of the parents as against the state. 
The interests advanced by the parents in these cases were not shown 
to be different from, or adverse to, those of their children. For exam-
ple, in Yoder, where the Supreme Court held that the Amish were ex-
empt from a compulsory school attendance law, the majority opinion 
made it clear that the rights of the children were not before it. 35 Jus-
tice Douglas concurred in the result insofar as it applied to one child 
31 The dissent also offered three narrower grounds of decision. First, the minor's 
constitutional right to have an abortion was reasonably protected by the statutory provi-
sion empowering a reviewing state court judge to override the parents' objections upon 
a showing that "the minor is mature enough to give an informed consent ... and has 
been adequately informed about the nature of an abortion and its probable conse-
quences to her." Id. at 864. Second, the parents of the minor in this case should have 
been joined as indispensable parties to the action, pursuant to FED. R. C1v. P. 19. !d. at 
857-59. The parents of Mary Moe had no knowledge of her pregnancy, the abortion, 
or the court proceedings. The defendants' motion to join the parents as indispensable 
parties was denied. !d. Neither the court itself nor the defendants knew Mary Moe's 
real identity, and the majority ordered the defendants not to attempt to discover either 
her identity or that of her parents. !d. at 857-58. Third, a guardian ad litem should 
have been appointed for the minor, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c). !d. at 859-60. 
Mary Moe was represented by the same counsel as all the other plaintiffs, and the dis-
sent viewed this as a conflict of interest. The majority expressly rejected this contention. 
!d. at 850 n.5. The defendants continued to press these issues in their appeal to the 
Supreme Court. See Appellants' Statement, Belloti v. Baird, No. 75-73. 
It is unlikely that the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 
order to speak to the guardian ad litem issue or the indispensable party issue. The in-
dispensable party issue is a derivative question. It depends on the underlying recogni-
tion of the parents' claim to participate in the abortion decision of their minor daugh-
ter. If the state defendants do not stress the guardian ad litem issue, they may be ex-
cused, because the very statute they defend explicitly waives the requirement of the ap-
pointment of a guardian in the event of a hearing. G.L. c. 112, § 12P(l). The statutory 
provision for judicial review of the parent's refusal of consent may, however, prove a 
pivotal point in the view of the Supreme Court. See text at notes 21 and 22 supra. 
32 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Pierce, the Court held that an Oregon law, which made 
public school attendance compulsory, was unconstitutional: 
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in the Union re-
pose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing 
them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere 
creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with thL high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obliga-
tions. 
Id. at 535. 
33 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1932). In Meyer, the Court struck down a Nebraska statute that 
prohibited the teaching of any modern language, other than English, to a child who 
had not passed the eighth grade. ld. 
34 406 u.s. 205 (1972). 
35 !d. at 230-31. 
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whose views on the matter had been heard by the Court, but he dis-
sented as to all the other children whose views had not been solicited. 
He recognized that the children had constitutionally protected in-
terests in their own right, and took the position that "where the child 
is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be 
an invasion of the child's rights to permit such an imposition without 
canvassing his views."36 
The significance of the question reserved in Yoder-how to resolve 
situations in which the claims of the parent and the child are 
adverse-was never wholly confronted by the analysis of either the 
majority or dissenting opinions in Baird. Although both opinions rec-
ognized that the relationship of parent to child was more complex 
than one of competing rights, 37 both opinions "forced" the resolution 
into the familiar mold of adjudging between competing interests.38 In 
doing so, the core questions of what is the source and scope of paren-
tal power was never directly faced. 
The power of parents over their children may be viewed essentially 
in two theoretical perspectives. One theory, derived from the axiom 
that the state is the ultimate source of all legal power,39 is that paren-
tal power is conferred or delegated by the state. According to this 
view, state power is the proper measure of the limits of parental 
power, or put differently, the state cannot confer or legitimate power 
that it did not itself possess.40 Under this theory, the appropriate in-
quiry in Baird is whether the state could constitutionally do that which 
section 12P empowered the parents to do. Simply, could the state 
deny an abortion, by a licensed physician in the first trimester, to a 
pregnant minor? 
The only power the state has under Roe v. Wade during the first 
trimester is to facilitate, by providing safeguards41 for or minimizing 
36 !d. at 241, 242-43 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
37 The majority suggested that parents' "rights" might not exist independent of their 
childrens' interest. 393 F. Supp. at 856. Whenever the dissent referred to the "rights" 
of parents, it usually did so in conjunction with the term "duties." Id. at 862. See note 
30 supra. 
38 The majority may have felt constrained to consider the case in this guise, because 
the defendants argued their case below in those terms. 393 F. Supp. at 855. By reduc-
ing the ultimate question to which interest is more important, the choices made take on 
an almost personal coloration. 
39 See J. AusTIN.jURISPRUDENCE 37 (4th ed. rev. 1873). 
40 !d. 
41 In Connecticut v. Menillo,-U.S.-, 96 S. Ct. 170 (1975), the Court held that a 
Connecticut statute prohibiting attempted abortion by "any person" was not unconstitu-
tional as applied to an attempted abortion performed by a person who was not a physi-
cian. The Court explained that its holding in Roe v. Wade was predicated upon the 
abortion being "performed by medically competent personnel under conditions insur-
ing maximum safety for the woman." !d., 96 S. Ct. at 171. 
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interference with,42 the decision of the pregnant woman. Because the 
state's duty under the well-established doctrine of parens patriae is to 
advance the welfare and pursue the best interests of the minor, 43 unless 
the state can establish that the best interests of a pregnant minor are 
different than those of a pregnant adult, the only power the state pos-
sesses regarding a minor who desires an abortion is to facilitate her 
decision-making by informing her of the physical and psychological 
implications of her decision so that she can, to the best of her ability, 
make an informed decision. 
There does not seem to be any dispute that the best interests of the 
minor mother are identical to those of an adult mother. The dispute, 
of course, is about whether the minor's decision is sufficiently mature 
to accord it recognition. The propriety of the conclusion to abort or 
not does not bear on this question of the maturity of the decision and 
therefore is unrelated to the determination of the minor's best 
interests. 44 
According to this analysis, section 12P fails because it does not cir-
cumscribe the parents, in the first instance, within the proper scope of 
their power-as the court put it- "to counsel and guide."45 The state 
should be limited to establishing procedures for helping the minor 
mother to reach a mature decision, if she is capable of doing so. Only 
upon determination that she was unable to do so would the state be 
free to delegate the decision-making to others, possibly the parents.46 
42 Hospital regulations that unduly restricted the right to an abortion have been 
struck down by several federal courts. See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975); 
Doe v. Hale Hospital, 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied,-U.S.-,95 S. Ct. 825 
(1975); Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974). Cf Doe v. Poelker, 
515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1975) (excusing individual employees from participating in abor-
tions on grounds of conscientious objection). See also Doe v. Doe, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1089,314 N.E.2d 128 (1974); and note 29supra. 
43 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167-69 (1944); Richards v. Forrest, 278 
Mass. 547,553, 180 N.E. 508,511 (1932); Dumain v. Gwynne, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 270, 
271-72 (1865). 
44 For this reason, presumably no one has asserted that the minor's decision to bear 
her child may be overruled by her parents or the state, as not in her best interests, ex-
cept for exigent medical reasons. (G.L. c. 112, § 12N, exempts an emergency abortion 
from consent requirements.) See In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972) 
(parent unsuccessfully sought to compel her minor daughter to have an abortion). 
An abortion under § 12P in fact requires the consent of the minor, as well as her 
parents. Apparently an adolescent mother is presumed by the Legislature to be compe-
tent to make an informed decision against abortion but not for abortion. Supposedly, in 
light of Roe v. Wade, this legislative presumption cannot be justified in terms of the 
state's interest in potential life during the first trimester. 
45 393 F. Supp. at 856. 
46 Even at this juncture the state arguably might be required to adopt a procedure to 
"safeguard" minors from nonsupportive or recriminatory parental attitudes. The court 
in Baird even cast some doubt on more narrowly drawn legislation that might require 
mere notification of parents and an opportunity to communicate with the minor: 
There are also minors who, understandably, do not wish to have their parents 
know of their condition because of the distress that it would cause them, and the 
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Nonetheless, another general theory of parental power exists and 
must be considered. The dissenting opinion, rejecting the theory that 
parental power is predicated upon state power, adopted this other 
theory, which holds that the institution of the family provides an an-
tecedent, independent source of authorityY Implicit in this theory is 
the idea that the state should not, and certainly need not, interfere 
with parental authority operating within traditional spheres, such as 
consent to surgical procedures. 48 In accordance with this interpreta-
tion, the doctrine of parens patriae merely operates to curb alleged 
abuses of parental power. 49 Seen in this light, the provision for judi-
cial review "for good cause shown" in section 12P is a manifestation of 
the appropriate parens patriae role of the state. 
In abstract terms, the foregoing position may be perfectly sound. 
Judicial judgments, however, turn on the application of theory to real 
circumstances. Put to this test, the theory founders. 
The applicability of the theory depends on the definition or scope 
of the "traditional sphere of authority" of parents. If it is defined 
normatively-in terms of the power parents ought to have-the entire 
argument becomes tautological. If instead the "sphere of authority" is 
measured in terms of tradition-legal or customary50-or in terms of 
minor's own consequent feelings. While we shall not deal with this aspect further, 
we note that in a very real sense it precisely fits standard concepts of the right of 
privacy. 
!d. at 853. See State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 914, 917, 530 P.2d 260, 268, 270 
(1975) (concurring opinion) for the view that parental notification requirements of this 
type would likely pass constitutional muster. Unquestionably, a notification statute, or a 
statutory scheme that reversed the legislative presumption and imposed the initiative 
for a hearing upon parents (on the ground that a proposed abortion would be harmful 
to the physical or mental health of their child) would present closer constitutional ques-
tions than§ 12P. 
47 See 393 F. Supp. at 862, quoted in part at note 30 supra. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965), in his dissenting opinion, Justice Black characterized this theory as 
a "natural law due process philosophy." /d. at 507, 515. 
48 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also, E. 
HAYT, THE LAW OF HOSPJT AL, PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 463-86 (3rd ed. 1972). 
49 See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. Wash. 
1967), affd 390 U.S. 598 (1968); In re Kauch, 358 Mass. 327, 264 N.E.2d 371 (1970). 
Cf Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 
537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (court appointed guardian when mother re-
fused life preserving blood transfusions for viable fetus). 
50 The common law required the consent of one parent for medical treatment of a 
child. See MORRIS AND MORITZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 161, 163 (5th ed. 
1971 ). The rule may have rested on the common law assumption that the father spoke 
for the family, but in modern times consent of either parent has been deemed suffi-
cient. See In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 951, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624, 627 (N.Y.C. Dom. Rei. 
Ct. 1941), where court authorized an operation opposed by father and consented to by 
mother. Cf In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942), where court refused 
to order ·an operation medically recommended because mother denied consent and 
father "abdicated" his duty to decide. 
The court in Baird noted that accepted medical practice in Massachusetts required 
"the consent of a parent." 393 F. Supp. at 855 (emphasis added). 
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actual control of parents over their adolescent children's sexual be-
havior, there is hardly any basis for claiming that the "sphere" ex-
tends as far as the powers conferred by section 12P.51 If indeed, prior 
to the enactment of section 12P, the consent of one parent was legally 
sufficient, it is difficult to comprehend on what ground the state rests 
its preference for the decision of the parent who opposes abortion. 
Were the state actually striving to do no more than implement the pa-
rental will, as this theory posits, the state should have refrained from 
acting in cases in which parental will was divided. 
The independent parental power theory also proves wanting with 
respect to the judicial review provision of section 12P-the provision 
upon which the validity of the statute ultimately turns. 52 If the statu-
tory language "for good cause shown" should be interpreted as impos-
ing the reviewing standard of "the best interests of the child," as the 
dissent correctly asserts,53 then section 12P creates an anomaly. The 
anomaly is that the statute does not limit parents to exercising their 
judgment according to the same standard, or even about the same 
matter, that the reviewing court must look to. The scope of the re-
viewing court's inquiry is, in the words of the dissent, to determine if 
"the minor is mature enough to give an informed consent and that 
she has been adequately informed about the nature of an abortion 
and its probable consequences to her. "54 The parental power to with-
hold consent simply exceeds the standard by which an abuse of the 
parents' authority is to be tested. The power to abuse is inherent in 
any authority, but it can never be claimed as part of the definition of 
the authority. 
In the end, both theoretical approaches converge in the doctrinal 
proposition that section 12P is overbroad.55 Two general suppositions, 
51 Unless physicians were required by law to inform parents of their child's request 
for an abortion, parental involvement would depend on the voluntary disclosure by the 
minor. 
52 The appellants, in their brief to the Supreme Court, with candor concede that "[i]f 
§ 12P provided no (judicial] recourse ... constitutional problems might exist." On this 
basis, they contrast the parental consent statutes struck down in State v. Koome, 84 
Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975) and Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 
1975). Brieffor Appellants, Bellotti v. Baird, No. 75-73, at 53. 
53 393 F. Supp. at 864. As noted previously, the majority believed that the reviewing 
court was not necessarily bound to protect the best interests of the child. See text at 
note 21 supra. The dissent has the best of the argument on this point, not only because 
federal policy requires that the court must assume that state judges will be faithful to 
their constitutional responsibilities, 393 F. Supp. at 864-65 n.16, but in order to avoid 
the force of the argument for abstention. /d. at 863 n.15. 
54 393 F. Supp. at 863-64. 
55 "[A] governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject 
to state regulation may not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and 
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 
(1964). But see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), suggesting curtailment of 
the doctrine in certain contexts. 
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both indulged by the court in Baird, conduce to support this proposi-
tion of overbreadth: (1) some, perhaps many, minors are capable of 
forming mature judgments about abortions; 56 and, (2) some parents 
are likely to withhold consent for an abortion for reasons unrelated to 
their child's capacity to form a mature judgment about abortion. 57 
These suppositions were not seriously challenged. 58 Instead, the 
Commonwealth emphasized that the provision for judicial review re-
lieved the statute of its overbreadth. Perhaps another supposition, one 
within the expertise of the bench and bar, should have been the basis 
of the court's response to the Commonwealth's assertion that the re-
view provision saved the statute, i.e., that minor women, generally 
without independent resources or kpowledge of the law, have no 
realistic access to the legal process. 59 
§12.7. Exclusion of Employables from General Relief: Irrebutta-
ble Presumptions and the Right to Welfare. The assistance of all 
residents of the Commonwealth in economic need was a tradition 
which dated back to colonial times. 1 In 197 5, with the enactment of 
amendments to sections 1 and 4 of chapter 117 of the General Laws,2 
that tradition ended. As Governor Dukakis explained in his message 
in support of the amendments: 
Our intention in redefining eligibility for General Relief is to 
make it clear that General Relief henceforth cannot be expected 
to meet the needs of every person in the Commonwealth with a 
demonstrable need, regardless of that person's other characteris-
tics or his employment situation. 3 
Before enactment of the amendments, the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives propounded two questions to the Supreme Judicial 
Court concerning the constitutionality of the proposed amendments 
56 393 F. Supp. at 854-55. 
57 /d. at 853-54. 
58 The dissenting opinion did raise the question whether these "facts" were proven as 
to the minor plaintiff. /d. at 859. This question touches on the distinction drawn be-
tween legislative and adjudicative facts, on how a court informs itself of "facts" that sup-
port its suppositions, and the proper role of courts in pursuing such inquiries. See Mil-
ler & Barron, The Supreme Court, The Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the 
justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975). 
59 The Legal Services Corporation Act excludes legal assistance to "any unemanci-
pated person of less than eighteen years of age" generally, and prohibits provision of 
legal assistance for nontherapeutic abortions regardless of age. 42 U .S.C.A. § 
2996f(b)(4) and (8) (Supp. 1976). 
§12.7. 1 Colonial laws (1890 ed.) 123, § 2, reprinted in Acts of 1788, c. 61. See Opin-
ion of the justices, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2521,2548,333 N.E.2d 388,400 (1975). 
2 Acts of 1975, c. 618, §§ I and 2. 
3 As quoted in Opinion of the Justices, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2521, 2539, 333 N.E.2d 
388, 397 (1975). 
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of the General Relief program, chapter 117 of the General Laws.4 In 
Opinion of the justices to the House of Representatives, 5 the Supreme Judi-
cial Court answered each question of constitutional doubt negatively. 6 
Prior to its amendment, section 1 of chapter 117 of the General 
Laws, 7 established the scope of the General Relief program in the fol-
lowing broad terms: 
The commonwealth ... shall assist, to the extent practicable, all 
poor and indigent persons residing therein, whenever they stand 
in need of such assistance. The aid furnished shall be . . . suffi-
cient to maintain an adequate standard of living for the poor and 
indigent applicant and his immediate family who are eligible ... 
[and] in an amount to be determined in accordance with budget-
ary standards of the department [of public welfare]. 8 
The amended version of section 1 constitutes a radical change. 9 It 
provides: "The commonwealth ... shall provide assistance to residents 
... found by the department [of public welfare] to be eligible for such 
assistance iri accordance with this chapter."10 
Although the amended version of section 1 constitutes the essence 
of the change made in the General Relief program, it did not attract 
the attention, publically or analytically, that the exclusionary language 
of amended section 4 commanded because section 4 figuratively con-
stitutes the "cutting edge" of the amendments. 11 The amended section 
4 reads in part: "A person who has no dependent children and who is 
determined by the department in accordance with its regulations to be 
employable shall not be eligible for assistance under this chapter."12 
4 I975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 252I-22, 333 N.E.2d at 39I-92. Two other questions pro-
pounded are not treated in this discussion. One of these asked whether making certain 
unemployed parents ineligible for General Relief would be in violation of federal stat-
utes. The other question pertained to an amendment to G.L. c. liSE, § 6, which relates 
to medical care and services for the needy. I975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2522, 333 N.E.2d at 
39I-92. 
5 I975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 252I, 333 N.E.2d 388 (1975). 
6 Id. at 252I-23, 2549, 333 N.E.2d at 39I-92, 400. 
7 Acts of I97I, c. 908, § I, as amended by Acts of I974, c. 623, § 2. 
8 Id. Even under this former law, certain categories of needy people were excluded, 
such as persons younger than eighteen and older than sixty-five, and all students. 
These exclusions presumably dovetailed with coverage by state or federal categorical as-
sistance programs. The age limitations were declared unconstitutional in Morales v. 
Minter, 393 F. Supp. 88 (D. Mass. I975). See notes IS-20 infra. 
9 G.L. c. II7, § I, as amended by Acts of I97 5, c. 6I8, § I. This change precipitated the 
first question propounded to the Supreme Judicial Court-whether the Legislature had 
properly delegated the authority to determine welfare eligibility to the Department of 
Welfare with no other guidelines than "in accordance with this chapter." 
to I d. 
11 Acts of I975, c. 6I8, § 2, amending G.L. c. II7, § 4 (I975). 
12 /d. The remainder of the amended version of G.L. c. Il7, § 4, consists of various 
excluded categories of persons, including the only group mentioned in the former § 
4-i.e., students-presumed to be eligible under other categorical programs. I d. 
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Question three posed by the House pertained to this exclusionary 
language, and the better part of the Opinion of the justices was devoted 
to its treatment. 13 The question posed was whether this particular ex-
clusion violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
fourteenth amendment, especially in view of Morales v. Minter, 14 a re-
cent decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. 15 The Supreme 
Judicial Court concluded that the proposed amendment was 
constitutional. 16 
The Court began its analysis of question three by distinguishing the 
Morales case from the question before it. 17 In Morales, a federal district 
court upheld a constitutional challenge to the requirement of section 
4 of chapter 117, as then in effect, that applicants for General Relief 
be between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five, concluding that the 
statute created an irrebuttable presumption and therefore violated the 
due process clause. 18 The court in Morales found that the age limita-
tions imposed by section 4 created a "conclusive and irrebuttable pre-
sumption," with no opportunity for an individualized determination 
that persons under eighteen or over sixty-five were not in need of fi-
nancial assistance. 19 Since that presumption was "not necessarily or 
universally true," the court concluded that it violated due process 
safeguards. 20 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the precedential value of 
Morales for two reasons. One reason was that the United States Su-
preme Court's opinion in Weinberger v. Salfi, 21 decided subsequent to 
Morales, cast doubt on whether the irrebuttable presumption analysis 
is the appropriate form of review in cases involving welfare claims. 22 
In Salfi, the Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge to a 
provision of the Social Security Act pursuant to which surviving wives 
and stepchildren of deceased wage earners were eligible for insurance 
benefits only if their relationship to the deceased had commenced at 
least nine months prior to his death.23 
Reversing the lower court decision,24 which had held the duration-
of-relationship requirement invalid because the requirement irrebut-
tably presumed a fact (sham marriage) that was not necessarily or 
13 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2537-49, 333 N.E.2d at 396-400. 
14 393 F. Supp. 88 (D. Mass. 1975). 
15 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2537, 333 N.E.2d at 396. 
16 See text at note 6supra. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2537-49, 333 N.E.2d at 396-400. 
17 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2539-40, 333 N.E.2d at 397. 
18 393 F. Supp. at 96. 
19 !d. 
20 !d. 
21 422 u.s. 749 (1975). 
22 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2540, 333 N.E.2d at 397. 
23 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c)(5) and (e)(2) (1970). 
24 Weinberger v. Salfi, 373 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
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universally true,25 the Supreme Court held the duration requirement 
rationally related to the legitimate legislative objective of avoiding, by 
an easily administered prophylatic rule, the abuse of entering sham 
marriages to secure social security benefits. 26 
The Supreme Court in Salfi discussed the appropriate standard of 
review for challenges to the constitutionality of welfare legislationP 
The Court attempted to distinguish cases such as Stanley v. Illinois, 28 
and Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 29 in which irrebuttable 
presumptions had been held invalid in other legislative schemes, 30 on 
the ground that such cases involved claims enjoying "constitutionally 
protected status," whereas "a noncontractual claim to receive funds 
from the public treasury" does not enjoy similar status.31 The Su-
preme Court concluded that under such circumstances, the appro-
priate standard of review is whether or not the challenged criteria are 
rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective. 32 
In applying this test, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the 
proposed exemption from General Relief benefits represented a ra-
tional means of furthering the state's avowed purpose of allocating fi-
nite resources where they are most needed: 33 
25 /d. at 965. The three-judge federal district court, relying on legislative history, had 
concluded that the purpose of the duration-of-relationship requirement had been to 
prevent sham marriages merely designed to secure Social Security benefits. !d. The 
lower court concluded that a presumption was created that marriages of less than nine 
months' duration were shams. !d. The presumption, moreover, was conclusive because 
the applicant was not afforded an opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit 
purpose, although admittedly the presumed fact was not necessarily or universally true. 
!d. at 965-66. The district court found that this arbitrary foreclosure of proof of a 
genuine marriage was violative of due process. !d. 
28 422 U.S. at 777. 
27 !d. at 768-70. 
28 405 u.s. 645 (1972). 
29 414 u.s. 632 (1974). 
30 In Stanley, the Court held that it was a denial of equal protection for the state to 
deny a hearing on parental fitness to an unwed father when such a hearing was pro-
vided to all other parents in custody challenges. 405 U.S. at 658. In La Fleur, the Court 
held invalid school board regulations requiring pregnant school teachers to take unpaid 
maternity leave commencing five months before expected birth. 414 U.S. at 644-46. 
31 422 U.S. at 772. In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), the Court held invalid a 
statutory definition of "residents" for purposes of fixing tuition to be paid in a state 
university system. The majority in Salfi attempted to distinguish Vlandis on the basis 
that: 
[W]here Connecticut purported to be concerned with residency, it might not at the 
same time deny to one seeking to meet its test of residency the opportunity to 
show factors clearly bearing on that issue. By contrast, "the Social Security Act [at 
issue in Salfi] does not purport to speak in terms of the bona fides of the parties to 
a marriage, but then make plainly relevant evidence of such bona fides inadmis-
sible." 
422 U.S. at 772. As Justice Brennan suggested in his dissent, Vlandis is not so readily 
distinguishable. !d. at 803. 
32 422 U.S. at 772. 
33 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2547, 333 N.E.2d at 399. 
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Thus, in light of the Commonwealth's asserted inability to provide 
assistance to all those in financial need, the eligibility restriction 
introduced by the bill does not appear to us to represent an irra-
tional means to accomplish the Commonwealth's objectives.34 
The other, and in the Court's view, more important reason for not 
following Morales, was that the rationale in Morales rested on the 
proposition that the Commonwealth formerly purported "to assist all 
its residents in need of assistance."35 Since the amended version of 
section I of chapter II 7 no longer purports to cover all persons in 
need, the Court reasoned, the presumption that any person excluded 
is in fact not needy is not relevant.36 The Court concluded that "we 
are not faced with the question whether it is 'necessarily or universally 
true' that 'employable' persons are not in need of assistance."37 
Implicit in this reasoning process is the validity of the proposition, 
entailed in the amended version of section I of chapter II 7, that the 
Commonwealth may aid some of its needy residents and not others. 
The Court addressed this proposition indirectly when it answered 
question one38 -regarding the delegation of eligibility determination 
to the welfare department-and then directly in the latter portion of 
its opinion.39 It approached the direct answer by observing that a due 
process challenge to the eligibility standards of a welfare statute 
dovetails with the claims that the classification drawn between those 
eligible for benefits and those not eligible violates equal protection.40 
Basically, the needy excluded are demanding an answer to the ques-
tion "why us and not them."41 The Court found the answer in the 
traditional test of whether the eligibility standard rationally furthers a 
legitimate state purpose. 42 
Concluding that the principal objective of the proposed 
amendment-"to achieve ... a necessary allocation of finite State re-
sources in a time of fiscal crisis"43 -was a legitimate state objective, 
the Court noted that the Legislature may properly allocate funds to a 
somewhat limited class of recipients rather than spreading the same 
funds among all potential recipients.44 
34 /d. 
35 !d. at 2539, 333 N.E.2d at 397. 
36 /d. at 2539-40, 333 N.E.2d at 397. 
37 /d. at 2540, 333 N.E.2d at 397. 
38 !d. at 2525-28, 333 N.E.2d at 392-93. 
39 /d. at 2543-49, 333 N.E.2d at 398-400. At one point, the Court remarked: "We 
might add that we are aware of no constitutional obligation on the State to provide fi-
nancial assistance to all its needy residents." !d. at 2544, 333 N.E.2d at 398. 
40 /d. at 2542, 333 N.E.2d at 398. 
41 !d. 
42 /d. 
43 !d. at 2543, 333 N.E.2d at 398. 
44 !d. at 2544, 333 N.E.2d at 398. 
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This statement of legislative objective -saving the Commonwealth 
money-is, to say the least, a very curious notion of a legitimate state 
objective. If this was the primary objective of the amendments, then 
any cuts the department instituted would be rationally directed to the 
achievement of that objective. For example, in pursuit of that objec-
tive the department might fairly decide to grant aid to every odd-
numbered applicant. It must be obvious that "saving money" can 
never be more than a contingent purpose. 
Nevertheless, the Court pursued this analysis to its "logical" conclu-
sion that the exclusion of employables is not an irrational means of 
accomplishing its objective. 45 The Court stated the analytical link in its 
argument as follows: "Given the Commonwealth's objective of preserv-
ing the fiscal integrity of its welfare programs, the question is whether 
this particular exclusion [of employables] is a rational means of ac-
complishing that objective, free from invidious discrimination."46 The 
Court immediately displayed the inconsistency of its own analysis, 
however, by attempting to demonstrate in the subsequent paragraphs 
a link between employability and a lesser deg;ree of need rather than the 
link between employability and preserving fiscal integrity. For example, 
the Court intimated that the Legislature's conclusion that employables 
are the most able to bear the hardships of an inadequate standard of 
living is not irrationalY 
In conclusion, when the Court actually examined the rationality of 
the exclusionary trait it did so, in terms of the underlying, primary 
purpose of the legislation, aiding those in need. Indeed, the Court ac-
knowledged as much when it considered question one-the delegation 
question.48 Moreover, at another point, the Court expressly stated that 
45 /d. at 2547, 333 N.E.2d at 399. 
46 /d. at 2544, 333 N.E.2d at 399. The Court did not expand on what it meant by the 
key phrase "invidious discrimination." Presumably it would characterize the "every 
odd-numbered applicant" scheme as invidious. 
47 /d. at 2544-45, 333 N.E.2d at 399. In so doing, the Court indulged such assump-
tions as: "among those persons with a genuine financial need, those who are employ-
able at least have the opportunity to meet that need . . . in the job market," id. at 
2545-46, 333 N.E.2d at 399; and that employables "receive the benefit of other gov-
ernmental efforts on their behalf." /d. 
48 /d. at 2526, 333 N.E.2d at 393. Responding to the argument that the amendments 
delegate to the department "unbridled discretion to determine who would be eligible 
for benefits and what benefits would be provided," id., the Court said: 
Although § 4 includes no description of those who are eligible, there can be no 
doubt that the only test for those not declared to be ineligible is financial need .... 
This conclusion finds further support in the traditional purpose of c. 117 as a re-
lief program for all those in need. 
ld. (emphasis added). The Court implicitly recognized that amended § 1 established no 
guidelines, noting that standards are to be derived from the bill as a whole. /d. In doing 
so, the Court rightly concluded that aid to the poor remained the overriding purpose. 
/d. 
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"the general purpose of the Commonwealth's welfare programs is to 
assist needy persons."49 
As much as the Court might have wished to isolate its analysis of 
the separate questions posed, when the opinion is read as a whole it is 
clear that the Court found the new legislation, like the preexisting 
legislation, to have the purpose of aiding all those in need except those 
specifically excluded. Once this is perceived, there is no way to distin-
guish Morales from the instant case unless one is prepared to establish 
that the Legislature's presumption regarding "employables" is worthy 
of more respect than the presumption regarding those "below 18 and 
over 65 years of age."50 
This criticism of the Court's analysis does not mean that the out-
come reached was necessarily wrong. In light of Salfi, the force of the 
"irrebuttable presumption" doctrine,51 which entails a direct judicial 
challenge to the legislative function of classifying,52 has been seriously 
eroded. If the Supreme Judicial Court is correct that ·Salfi appears to 
limit the doctrine to "affirmative Government action which seriously 
curtails important liberties cognizable under the Constitution,"53 then 
the Court's remark that "we are aware of no constitutional obligation 
on the State to provide financial assistance to all its needy residents,"54 
is apposite. Arguably however, Salfi can be limited to contexts in 
which the Legislature is dealing with ancilliary matters (e.g., sham 
marriages) rather than with presumptions that go to the core of the 
Legislature's purpose. The Supreme Court's statement in Salfi that the 
49 !d. at 2545, 333 N.E.2d at 399. 
50 The Supreme Judicial Court expressed sympathy for the harshness of the result. 
"In a time of high unemployment it may be little comfort indeed for persons genuinely 
in need to be told that they are 'employable' ... . "!d. at 2547, 333 N.E.2d at 400. It might 
have been more comforting if the Court had rested its acceptance of the Legislature's 
presumption on some facts. Is there any evidence for the assumption that employables may 
be able to fend better than people below eighteen or over sixty-five, in view of the other 
categorical programs and charitable programs available to these latter groups? Even the 10 
percent-unemployment rate does not reflect the true situation, in all likelihood, for such 
subgroups as young black men and unskilled labor. Moreover, the room for arbitrary 
uecision-making by agency personnel is far greater when applying standards such as "em-
ployability" rather than age or need standards. 
51 See Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Department of 
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Milton v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 403,312 
N.E.2d 188 (1974). 
52 See Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 660 (1974) (Rehnquist,J., 
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion in Salfi. 
53 422 U.S. at 785. See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2541, 333 N.E.2d at 397. 
54 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2544, 333 N.E.2d at 398. This administrative cost of effi-
ciency rationalization is not so readily applied to the Massachusetts scheme. The de-
partment presumably will have to invest as much-if not more-energy in fashioning 
and administering regulations relating to employability as they would in making deter-
minations, for ins.~ance, on a "severity of need" standard. 
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duration-of-relationship requirement might also represent a legislative 
policy determination that limited Social Security "resources would not 
be well spent in making individual determinations"55 is presumably 
not a statement that could be made about the core eligibility require-
ments of a program. 
In any event, whether an employability standard that is consistent 
with the general standard of aiding those in need can be worked out 
is now a matter that the claimants, the department, and the courts 
must struggle with. This process was alluded to in a footnote to the 
Court's opinion: 
We assume, of course, that the regulations promulgated by the 
department to define the class of persons to be deemed "employ-
able" would be written with this rationale in. mind. Regulations 
which are arbitrary in light of the statutory purpose could be chal-
lenged at the appropriate time under G.L. c. 30A, §§ 3, 7. Fur-
thermore, a determination that a particular individual is "employ-
able" under the regulations and, hence, ineligible for GR benefits 
would be subject to procedural safeguards, including a hearing 
and the opportunity for judicial review. G.L. c. 18, § 16.56 
On December 24, 1975, in Perez v. Stevens, 57 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts decided to abstain from 
resolving the constitutional challenges to the statute and the 
regulations,58 until the state courts resolve the question whether the 
regulations are consistent with the statute. Thus, a definitive answer 
to these questions may be expected sometime in the indefinite future. 
One hopes that the plaintiffs, who were denied preliminary injunctive 
relief during the pendency of these actions, 59 can also wait. 
§12.8. Warrantless Arrests in a Dwelling. During the Survey year, 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Forde 1 limited the 
ability of police to make a warrantless entry into a dwelling to make 
an arrest.2 The facts in Forde are as follows. The defendant's apart-
ment had been under police surveillance for almost six months. Prior 
to his arrest, the police had received information from a reliable in-
formant that drugs were being sold by persons residing in the apart-
ment. Upon learning that there was a likelihood of a sale on De-
cember 27, 1971, the police "staked out" the defendant's apartment. 
55 422 U.S. at 784. 
56 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2546, 333 N.E.2d at 399. 
57 Memorandum Opinion, Civ. Action No. 75-4529-F (D. Mass. 1975). 
58 Jd. at 2. 
59 !d. at 2-3. 
§12.8. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1625, 329 N.E.2d 717. 
'Id. at 1637, 329 N.E.2d at 722. 
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Subsequently, they arrested Donald McDonald, who had been seen 
entering the defendant's apartment and leaving with a shopping bag. 
Marijuana was found in the bag and McDonald and three others were 
taken to police headquarters at 8:30 p.m.3 At 11:30 p.m., the police 
were informed by an assistant district attorney that a warrant would 
be required to search the defendant's apartment. Prior to this time, 
the police made no effort to obtain any type of warrant for entry and 
search of the defendant's apartment. It was at this point that police 
overheard McDonald advising two of his companions to warn the 
others at the defendant's apartment. The police futilely sought to ob-
tain a warrant, but were unable to contact either of th!;! district court 
clerks. They then sent eight officers to the defendant's apartment and 
arrested all of the occupants, including the defendant.4 A search war-
rant was subsequently obtained based on the evidence in plain view at 
the time of the initial entry into Forde's apartment. 5 
The defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana and LSD 
and possession with intent to sell the same. 6 He appealed and the Ap-
peals Court reversed his conviction, 7 holding that although the arrests 
were valid, a search incident to the arrest could not be justified where 
no exigent circumstances excused the lack of a search warrant. 8 The 
Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court. 9 . 
In Forde, the Commonwealth argued in the alternative that (1) exi-
gent circumstances had precipitated the warrantless entry and search; 10 
and (2) the entry and subsequent search were justified as incident to a 
valid arrest.U The Court, however, found that (1) the claimed ex-
igency was reasonably foreseeable; 12 and (2) the fourth amendment 
prohibits a warrantless entry into a dwelling to make an arrest in the 
3 Id. at 1625-27,329 N.E.2d at 718-19. 
4 Id. at i625-28, 329 N.E.2d at 718-19. When the apartment door opened, the offi-
cers immediately arrested three persons standing close to the door, then arrested three 
other persons in the Jiving room, and then fanned out through the apartment as one of 
the prisoners fled toward a back bedroom. Three others, including the defendant, were 
arrested in the kitchen. There were a warm pipe and bags of marijuana in plain view in 
the living room. Five glassine bags containing LSD were seen in an open bureau drawer 
in the bOiler room in back of the apartment. See Commonwealth v. Forde, 1974 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 725, 727-28, 313 N.E.2d 581, 583. 
5 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1625-28, 329 N.E.2d at 718-19. 
6 Id. at 1625, 329 N.E.2d 718. At the suppression hearing the chief investigator for 
the police testified that he had planned to obtain a search warrant but had failed to do 
so. Id. at 1626, 329 N.E.2d at 719. 
7 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 732, 313 N.E.2d at 586. . 
8 I d. 
9 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1626, 329 N.E.2d at 718. 
10 Id. at 1628, 329 N.E.2d at 719. 
11 Id. at 1632, 329 N.E.2d at 721. 
12 I d. at 1630, 329 N.E.2d at 720. 
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absence of sufficient justification for the failure to obtain a warrant. 13 
In Forde, the exigency was "said to spring from" McDonald's en-
couragement of his companions to warn the persons still at the 
defendant's apartment. 14 Presumably, such a warning would have re-
sulted in the destruction or removal of the drugs. 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court agreed that the exigency 
created by McDonald's admonition, if considered alone, would have 
constituted a sufficient justification for a warrantless entry, it nonethe-
less concluded that the propriety of the warrantless entry into a dwell-
ing must be evaluated from the totality of the circumstances. 15 Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice Reardon16 held the exigency claim unjustifi-
able not only because the police had been watching the apartment for 
six months, 17 but also because any reasonable officer could have 
foreseen the risk (during the three hours of booking procedures) that 
one of the arrestees would be released and might warn the 
defendant. 18 Therefore, the Court found that "[i]n these circum-
stances, the failure of the Commonwealth to offer any explanation 
why no effort was made to obtain a warrant in the 3 hours prior to 
the McDonald conversation ... is fatal to its claim of exigency."19 
Alternatively, the Commonwealth sought to justify the warrantless 
search and seizure as a seizure of evidence in plain view, incident to a 
valid arrest. 20 The Commonwealth argued that the purpose of the 
entry was to arrest the apartment residents and that no warrant was 
necessary because the police had probable cause to believe that a 
felony had been committed.21 Affirming the decision of the Appeals 
Court-although rejecting its rationale22-the Court first assumed 
13 /d. at 1637, 329 N.E.2d at 722. 
14 !d. at 1629, 329 N.E.2d at 720. 
15 !d. at 1629-30, 329 N.E.2d at 720. 
16 /d. at 1625, 329 N.E.2d at 718. 
17 /d. at 1630, 329 N.E.2d at 720. 
18 !d. 
19 !d. rna dissenting opinion, Justice Quirico accused the Court of applying a kind of 
"law enforcement estoppel, whereby the exigency exception to the warrant requirement 
is shut off where the exigency is reasonably foreseeable." !d. at 1653, 329 N.E.2d at 728 
(dissenting opinion). The Court!s decision, however, does not require the police to con-
duct a search as soon as probable cause arises. Instead, the Court recognized that 
"where the police are conducting an investigation of continuing criminal activities, the 
exigency of circumstances which develop unexpectedly is not diminished by the fact 
that in hindsight it appears there would have been time to obtain a warrant." /d. at 
1632, 329 N.E.2d at 721. Thus, the Court's holding is limited to cases where the ex-
igency is reasonably foreseeable and the police offer no justifiable excuse for their prior 
delay in obtaining a warrant. The Court, however, fails to define a 'justifiable excuse." 
It is conceivable that, had the police, in the instant case, made several futile attempts to 
obtain a warrant in the three-hour booking period before the overheard conversation, a 
justifiable excuse would have existed. 
20 Id, at 1632, 329 N.E.2d at 721. 
21 See 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 731. 
22 1975 Mass. Adv. Sheet at 1633, 329 N.E.2d at 721. 
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that all the evidence seized in plain view was within the scope of a lim-
ited search incident to an arrest,23 as permitted by Chime/ v. 
California. 24 Therefore, the Court in Forde concluded that, if the ar-
rests were valid, the items in plain view could be seized and observa-
tions made by the police while making the arrests could provide the 
basis for the subsequent issuance of a search warrant, 25 regardless of 
whether or not the evidence was inadvertently discovered. 26 
Thus, the Court was forced to consider whether and under what 
circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a war-
rantless arrestP Although the United States Supreme Court has often 
noted the importance of this question, it has left the issue unsettled. 28 
In Forde, the Supreme Judicial Court departed from the common 
law rule that a police officer has the right to make an arrest without a 
warrant whenever he has probable cause to believe that the defendant 
has committed a felony. 29 The Court specifically limited this rule by 
holding that the fourth amendment prohibits a warrantless entry into 
a dwelling to arrest in the absence of sufficient justification for the 
failure to obtain a warrant. 30 Quoting from the Supreme Court's opin-
23 See id. at 1634, 329 N.E.2d 721. 
24 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Court in Chime/ held that the scope of a search incident 
to a lawful arrest is limited to search of the person and the areas within his immediate 
control, construing that phrase to mean the areas from within which he might gain pos-
session of a weapon or destructible evidence. !d. at 763. 
Although Chime/ has never been overruled, many circuit courts have attempted to 
discredit its rationale by expanding the interpretation of "within immediate control." 
See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 447 F.2d 424, 425 (lOth Cir. 1971) (female defen-
dant arrested for forgery while standing in doorway between kitchen and livingroom; 
court held search of envelope on shelf of kitchen cabinet four to six feet from defen-
dant permissible under Chime/ notwithstanding presence of five officers, one of whom 
stood between defendant and cabinet, and fact defendant was facing toward living-
room); United States v. Wysocki, 457 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1972). 
25 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1634, 329 N.E.2d at 721. Cf Comment, 1974 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW § 3.5, at 60. 
26 In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court held that a seizure 
is justified by the plain view exception only when the police have a prior justification 
for an intrusion, when the incriminating nature of the object seized is immediately ap-
parent, and when its discovery is inadvertent. !d. at 466. This limitation on the plain 
view doctrine was designed to prevent general warrantless searches when the police 
know what they are looking for and have time to seek a warrant. !d. at 466-67. 
Nonetheless, the Court was careful to note that the inadvertence requirement does not 
apply to items in plain view within the scope of a limited search incident to arrest as 
permitted by Chime/. See id. at 465 n.24. Therefore, the majority in Forde assumed the 
limitations set out in Coolidge did not apply. See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1633-34, 329 
N .E.2d at 721. 
27 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1634, 329 N.E.2d at 721. 
28 See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 44 U.S.L.W. 4112,4114 n.6 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1976); 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 n.13 (1975); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443, 476 (1971). 
29 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1637, 329 N.E.2d 722. 
30 !d. 
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ion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire 31 , the Court reasoned: 
It is clear, then, that the notion that the warrantless entry of a 
man's house in order to arrest him on probable cause is per se 
legitimate is in fundamental conflict with the basic principle of 
Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a man's 
house without a warrant are per se unreasonable in the absence of 
some one of a number of well defined 'exigent circumstances.'32 
Therefore, the Court in Forde concluded that "[t]he right of police of-
ficers to enter into a home ... represents a serious governmental in-
trusion into one's privacy. It was just this sort of intrusion that the 
Fourth Amendment was designed to circumscribe by the general re-
quirement of a judicial determination of probable cause.''33 
In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court found that there was no 
valid reason why the Supreme Court's oft-stated preference for search 
warrants should not be equally applicable to arrest warrants. 34 Indeed, 
an entry to arrest appears a far greater intrusion than an entry to 
search. 35 In a concurring opinion to United States v. Watson, 36 Justice 
Powell stated: 
Since the Fourth Amendment speaks equally to both searches and 
seizures, and since an arrest, the taking hold of one's person, is 
quintessentially a seizure, it would seem that the constitutional 
provision should impose the same limitations upon arrests that it 
does upon searches. Indeed, as an abstract matter an argument 
can be made that the restrictions upon arrest perhaps should be 
greater. A search may cause only annoyance and temporary in-
convenience to the law-abiding citizen, assuming more serious di-
mension only when it turns up evidence of criminality. An arrest, 
31 403 u.s. 443, 477-78 (1971). 
32 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1635, 329 N.E.2d at 722. 
33 I d. 
34 See id. at 1636, 329 N.E.2d at 722. 
35 This rationale was recently adopted by a plurality of Justices in United States v. 
Watson, 44 U.S.L.W. 4112 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1976). In Watson, the Court held that the 
fourth amendment permits a law officer to make a warrantless arrest in a public place, 
even though he had adequate opportunity to procure a warrant after developing prob-
able cause for arrest. Id. at 4ll6. Four Justices expressly adopted the rationale that an 
entry to arrest appears to be a far greater intrusion than an entry to search. See id. at 
4117 (Powell, J., Concurring); id. at 4122 (Marshall and Brennan, J.J., dissenting); and 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-79 (1971) (per Stewart, j.). 
38 44 U.S.L.W. 4112 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1976). 
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however, is a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the 
person seized is guilty or innocent. 37 
In a dissenting opinion to Forde, 38 Justice Quirico, however, argued 
strongly that although the Supreme Court· has expressed a preference 
for the use of arrest warrants when feasible, it has never invalidated 
an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers 
failed to secure a warrant. 39 He argued that the authority of a consta-
ble to arrest without a warrant in felony cases has been textbook law 
for centuries.40 Quoting from the early Massachusetts decision in 
Rohan v. Sawin, 41 Justice Quirico found: 
It has been sometimes contended, that an arrest .. ' . without a 
warrant, was a violation of the great fundamental ~rinciples of 
our national and state constitutions, forbidding unreasonable 
searches and arrests, except by warrant founded upon a com-
plaint made under oath. Those provisions doubtless had another 
and different purpose, being in restraint of _general warrants to 
make searches, and requiring warrants to issue only upon a com-
plaint made under oath. They do not conflict with the authority 
of constables or other peace-officers . . . to arrest without a war-
rant those who have committed felonies. The public safety, and 
the due apprehension of criminals, charged with heinous offenses, 
imperiously require that such arrests should be made without 
warrant by officers of the law. 42 
The Court countered Justice Quirico's argument by noting that, al-
though their conclusion departs from common law, the same result 
has been reached by nearly every court to address the issue.43 
Although the Supreme Court has specifically left the issue of war-
rantless arrests in private dwellings unanswered, the Court's extended 
discussion in Watson of section 120.6 of ALI Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure,44 which recommends adoption of the old 
37 Id. at 4117 (Powell, J., concurring). 
38 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1647, 329 N.E.2d at 725 (dissenting opinion). 
39 Id. at 1650, 329 N.E.2d at 727 (dissenting opinion). 
40 I d. at 1648, 329 N.E.2d at 726 (dissenting opinion). 
41 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281, 284-85 (1851). 
42 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1648-49, 329 N.E.2d at 726 (dissenting opinion), quoting 
Rohan v. Sawin, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281, 284-85 (1851). _ 
43 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1637, 329 N.E.2d at 723. See also Dorman v. United States, 
435 F.2d 385, 388-91 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d 984, 990-91 
(4th Cir. 1970). 
44 ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 120.6( 1) ( 1972). 
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common law rule, portends an ominous future for the Forde 
decision.45 It is submitted that during this period of preference for 
protection of personal liberties, a reversion to the common law rule 
would be a giant step into the past. 
Whereas both the Court and the dissenting justice preferred to view 
the issue in terms of justification for a warrantless arrest,46 Justice 
Hennessey in a concurring opinion found that the issue is best ap-
proached through an analysis of the plain view doctrine and the re-
quirement of inadvertence as a condition of the application of that 
doctrineY Justice Hennessey's preference for the plain view analysis 
appears to be predicated upon the assumption that the seizure was 
not within the scope of a Chime[ search. In Chime[ v. California, 48 the 
Supreme Court held that the scope of a search incident to a lawful ar-
rest is limited to search of the person and the areas within his im-
mediate control-i.e., the areas from within which he might gain pos-
session of a weapon or destructible evidence.49 In Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 50 however, the Supreme Court, although holding a seizure 
justified by the plain view exception only when the police have a prior 
justification for the intrusion and when the discovery of the object 
seized is inadvertent,51 carefully 'noted that the inadvertence require-
ment does not apply to items in plain view within the scope of a lim-
ited search incident to .arrest as permitted by Chimel. 52 
In conclusion,Justice Hennessey found no inadvertence where the 
police "in \anticipation of, .. and with probable cause to know of, the 
presence of incriminating evidence, wait for the person to be arrested 
to enter a dwelling house in order that they may place themselves in a 
position to gain a plain view of the evidence."53 Consequently, Justice 
Hennessey never reached the question of the validity of the arrests. In 
his dissenting opinion, Justice Quirico correctly questioned Justice 
Hennessey's reliance on the inadvertence doctrine because that part of 
the Coolidge decision was joined by only four Justices. 5 4 
45 See 44 U.S.L.W. at 4114 n.6. 
•.• Compare 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1633-37, 1647-51, 329 N.E.2d at 721-22, 725-27 
(dissenting opinion), with id. at 1641, 329 N.E.2d 724 (concurring opinion). 
47 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1642-43, 329 N.E.2d at 724-25 (concurring opinion). 
48 395 u.s. 752 (1969). 
49 I d. at 762-63. 
50 403 u.s. 443 (1971). 
51 Id. at 464-68. 
52 I d. at 465-66 n.24. 
53 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1642, 329 N.E.2d 724. 
54 See 403 U.S. at 464-73 (Stewart, ].,joined by Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, J.J.). 
Nonetheless, many courts have accepted the inadvertence requirement. See, e.g., United 
States v. Lisznyai, 470 F.2d 707, 709-10 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 987 (1973); 
United States v. Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 983 
(1973); Martinez v. Turner, 461 F.2d 261, 264-65 (lOth Cir. 1972). The California and 
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Whether or not one chooses to adopt the Coolidge plurality opinion 
as binding precedent, it is clear from the response of the lower courts 
that the Supreme Court's effort in Coolidge to clarify the plain view 
doctrine has hardly achieved complete success.55 Thus, regardless of 
whether the facts in Forde justify the Court's assumption-that the 
plain view conformed to the limits of Chimel-or Hennessey's 
assumption-the plain view was outside the limits of Chimel-the bet-
ter resolution of Forde lies in striking down the unjustified warrantless 
arrest in a private dwelling because "the security of one's privacy 
against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the 
Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society."56* 
STUDENT CoMMENT 
§12.9. State Action-Seizures under Authorization of Lessors' 
Lien Statutes:Davisv.Richmond 1 andPorter v. Fleischhacker 2 The 
Massachusetts boarding house and lodging house keepers' lien statute 
grants lessors a lien on a tenant's personal property within the rented 
premises for past rent due.3 It is generally understood to authorize 
Iowa Supreme Courts, however, have rejected Coolidge's discussion of plain view. North 
v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 307, 502 P.2d 1305, 1308, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 836 
(1972); State v. King, 191 N.W.2d 650,655-57 (Iowa 1971). 
55 In holding that a plain view seizure is proper only when the object seized is inad-
vertently discovered and only when its incriminating nature is immediately apparent, 
the Court in Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465-69, failed to define or give standards for deter-
mining the following: (1) whether or not the object is in plain view, (2) what degree of 
apparency (a suspicion, probable cause, or virtual certainty) is necessary in order to be 
seized lawfully, and (3) whether the inadvertence requirement applies only to evidence 
but not to contraband and stolen goods. Other authorities also point up Coolidge's fail-
ures in this regard. See United States v. Candella, 469 F.2d 173, 176-77 (2d Cir. 1972); 
United States v. Welsch, 446 F.2d 220, 222 (lOth Cir. 1971); United States v. Brewer, 
343 F. Supp. 468, 472-74 (D. Hawaii 1972). See also LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the 
Supreme Court: Future Ventures Into thf Quagmire, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9, 24-30 (1972); Com-
ment, "Plain View"-Anything But Plain: Coolidge Divides The Lower Courts, 7 LoYOLA L. 
REy. 489 (1974). 
56 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). 
*Section 12.8 was written by Jeffrey S. Sabin, a second-year student at Boston Col-
lege Law School. 
§ 12.9. 1 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975). 
2 No. 538 (Boston Housing Ct., Jan. 13, 1975). 
a G.L. c. 255, § 23, which provides: "Boarding house or lodging house keepers shall 
have a lien on the baggage and effects brought to their houses and belonging to their 
guests ... for all proper charges due for fare and board or lodging .... " 
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the lessor to take and hold the property upon the tenant's default. 4 
This right may be exercised without notifying the boarder of the in-
tended seizure or obtaining a judicial determination that the claim for 
rent is actually valid.5 
Plaintiffs in two recent cases have challenged the constitutionality of 
this lien statute on the ground that it authorizes a deprivation of 
property without due process of law. In Porter v. Fleischhacker, 6 the 
Boston Housing Court held that the lien statute is unconstitutional for 
failing to grant notice and a hearing to the tenant before seizure of 
his goods. 7 In Davis v. Richmond, 8 however, an action under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1864,9 the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit never reached the due process question because it held that 
the lien statute involves private, rather than state action, to which due 
process protections do not apply. 10 Thus, the two courts disagreed, 
not necessarily on the due process issue itself, but rather on the initial 
question of whether that issue should have been considered. 
Had the requisite state action been found in Davis, it is likely that the 
courts would have agreed that the Massachusetts boarding house and 
lodging house keepers' lien statute violated the plaintiffs' constitutional 
right to due process of law, in light of recent United States Supreme 
Court decisions holding various prejudgment seizures unconstitutional. 11 
4 Davis, 5I2 F.2d at 202; Porter, No. 538 at 4. 
5 No. 538 at 5. 
•INo. 538 (Boston Housing Ct., Jan. I3, I975) 
7 Id. at 4-7. 
8 5I2 F.2d 20I (1st Cir. I975). 
9 42 U.S.C. § I983 (1970) provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress. 
10 5I2 F.2d at 205. The Civil Rights Cases, I09 U.S. 3, II (1883), are cited for the 
proposition that constitutional safeguards apply only against state action. Id. at 202. 
U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in part: "nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; .... " 
11 North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 4I9 U.S. 601, 605 (1975); Fuentes 
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 
(I969). But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 6I9 (1974). In Mitchell, the 
Court upheld sequestration of personal property upon the ex parte application of a cred-
itor, who had originally sold the goods seized. Id. at 601, 6I9. The Mitchell decision ap-
peared to limit the broad statement in Fuentes that the state must provide due process 
protections before any deprivation of a significant property interest. Id. at 623 (Powell, 
]. concurring). In North Georgia, however, Fuentes was apparently resurrected. 4I9 U.S. 
at 608 (Stewart, ]. concurring). 
The facts of Mitchell differ slightly from those of the other cases, and are the basis of 
the contrary result. A seizure under the statute in Mitchell was only allowed upon a 
clear showing of the specific facts behind the creditor's claim, while under the statute in 
Fuentes, the creditor only had to make bare allegations of ownership. Mitchell, 416 U.S. 
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In particular, in Fuentes v. Shevin, 12 the Court held that a state could 
not infringe any significant property interest without first according 
due process rights to the holder of the interest. 13 The statutes held 
unconstitutional in Fuentes had authorized state officers to seize a 
person's possessions upon the ex parte application of an alleged 
creditor. 14 
Seizures under the authority of the Massachusetts lessors' lien stat-
ute involve no such clear state participation. A number of United 
States Supreme Court decisions, however, have noted that the action 
of a state need not be overt for the protections of due process to 
apply. 15 "(C]onduct that is formally 'private,' " the Court has said, 
"may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impreg-
nated with a governmental character as to become subject to the con-
stitutional limitations placed upon state action." 16 Thus, in the grey 
area between totally private and totally public conduct, the Court has 
tried to define the boundaries of the state action requirement17 
through a case-by-case analysis-a process of "sifting facts and weigh-
ing circumstances"18 to determine the significance of state involve-
ment in otherwise private conduct. 
State action has been found, for example, in the passage of a con-
at 616. Also important was the involvement of a judge-not a mere court functionary, 
as in Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 74, 76-at every step of the process in Mitchell, thus minimiz-
ing the risk of a wrongful taking. 416 U.S. at 616-17. The debtor was also entitled in 
Mitchell to an immediate hearing after the seizure. !d. at 610. In Fuentes, one of the 
challenged statutes provided for an eventual hearing, the other for none at all. 407 U.S. 
at 75, 77. 
For a close look at the development of the law in this area, see Catz and Robinson, 
Due Process and Creditor's Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to Mitchell, North Georgia 
and Beyond, 28 RuTGERS L. REv. 541 (1975); Hansford, Procedural Due Process in the 
Debtor-Creditor Relationship: The Impact of Di-Chem, 9 CEO. L. REV. 589 (1975); Scott, 
Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 
61 VA. L. REV. 807 (1975); and Comment, A Confusing Course Mack More Confusing: The 
Supreme Court, Due Process, and Summary Creditor Remedies, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 331 (1975). 
12407 u.s. 67 (1972). 
13 !d. at 86. 
14 !d. at 69, 96. 
15 E.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). 
16 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). 
17 The phrases "state action" and action "under color of' state law are often used in-
terchangeably by the courts and will be so used in this paper. "In cases under § 1983, 
'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the 'state action' 
required under the Fourteenth Amendment." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 
n.7 (1966). The same observation is made in one of the lessors' lien cases. Anastasia v. 
Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, No. 74-1995, 4 (7th Cir., Sept. 30, 1975). 
18 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). 
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stitutional amendment that would have significantly encouraged pri-
vate housing discrimination, 19 and where a private business' discrimi-
nation on property leased from the state involved the state as a joint 
participant. 20 The opposite result was reached where a private club 
with a state liquor license practiced racial discrimination,21 and where 
a state regulated utility terminated power to consumers without grant-
ing due process notice. 22 
Thus,· the Boston Housing Court, in Porter, and the First Circuit, in 
Davis, have sifted and weighed similar facts and circumstances and 
reached opposite conclusions concerning the existence of state action 
in seizures under the authority of the Massachusetts lien statute. Simi-
larly, a number of courts throughout the nation have divided on the 
constitutionality of other lessors' lien statutes. 23 Of the three other 
19 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1967). Reitman involved an amendment 
to California's constitution allowing freedom of choice in selling one's home, an 
amendment that, in effect, repealed several laws forbidding racial discrimination in 
such sales, and made such discrimination constitutionally permissible. Id. at 374, 376-77. 
This case has been interpreted to mean that significant state involvement in private ac-
tions is the standard for determining state action. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. 
lrvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972). 
20 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). The business, 
a coffee shop, had refused to serve Black patrons. Id. at 716. The business leased its 
premises from the Wilmington Parking Authority, a state agency. Jd. The Court held 
that the relationship between the state and the lessee bound the lessee to act in a con-
stitutional manner. /d. at 724-26. "The State has so far insinuated itself into a position 
of interdependence ... that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the chal-
lenged activity .... " ld. at 725. 
21 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972). The Court held that this 
state involvement did not significantly implicate the State in the discriminatory guest 
policies of the Lodge. !d. 
22 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974). The extensive state 
regulation was held not to create a sufficient relationship between the state and the util-
ity to warrant the imposition of due process protections with regard to the utility's ac-
tion. /d. Even the partial monopoly status granted by the state to the utility was not 
found to create the necessary relationship for a state action finding. !d. 
23 Although the various statutes do not necessarily apply to the same classes of 
lessors-some, e.g., ARIZ. REVISEp STAT.§ 33-951 (1956), apply to innkeepers, auto camp 
keepers, and others-this distinction has no effect on the state action question. Some 
states have more than one lien statute. For instance, Illinois has one lien for hotel, inn 
and boarding house keepers, ILL. REv. STAT. c. 82, §57, (1966), and a second lien apply-
ing only to hotel proprietors, ILL. REV. STAT. c. 71, § 2 (1959). 
The lien statutes also differ in their wording. Some specifically authorize a lessor to 
peaceably enter the tenant's premises to enforce the lien, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CoDE§ 1861 
(West 1954). Others hint at such a right, such as the Texas statute, see note 31 infra, 
which allows the landlord to "take and retain property," and some, such as that of Mass-
achusetts, see note 3 supra, say nothing about the right to seize. This difference in 
wording is also insignificant because even in those jurisdictions where the lien statute is 
silent on the right to enter and seize, the courts have found such a right to be implicit 
in the statute. Davis, 512 F.2d at 202; Culbertson v. Leland, No. 73-1749, 1 (9th Cir., 
Oct. 3, 1975); Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, No. 74-1995, 11 (7th Cir. Sept. 30, 
1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3467 (Feb. 24, 1976). Thus, the question remains 
whether the action authorized under the statutes in state action. 
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United States Courts of Appeals that have considered this issue, one24 
agrees with the First Circuit that seizures under the authority of such 
lien statutes do not constitute state action, while two25 have reached 
the opposite result. 
This comment will analyze the nature of this recent split of author-
ity in the area of state action. Both the history and application of the 
public function theory and the significant involvement standard, the 
two means of finding state action most often applied in the lessors' 
lien decisions, will be discussed. Comparisons will be made between 
the lessors' lien cases and decisions involving similar seizures: in par-
ticular, self-help repossession allowed under the Uniform Commercial 
Code.26 The possible treatment of future due process challenges to 
the lessors' lien laws will be examined. Finally, the need for legislative 
reform of lessors' lien laws and several possible improvements will be 
considered. 
I. A SURVEY OF THE LESSORS' LIEN DECISIONS 
The Boston Housing Court, in Porter, found state action in seizures 
under authorization of the Massachusetts lessors' lien statute on the 
ground that the lien statute created a right in favor of the boarding 
and lodging house keepers that they did not have at common law. 27 
Since this law provided the only justification for the seizure, the court 
concluded that a seizure under the statute involved state action. 28 
A totally different approach was adopted by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hall v. Garson, 29 which 
found state action in a seizure authorized by a Texas lien statute.30 
The statute gave the lessor a lien on tenants' goods within the rented 
· premises and granted the lessor authority to enforce the lien by a 
peremptory seizure.31 Finding that entrance into a home and seizure 
24 Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, No. 74-1995, 12 (7th Cir., Sept. 30, 1975), 
cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3467 (Feb. 24, 1976). 
25 Culbertson v. Leland, No. 73-1749, 9 (9th Cir., Oct. 3, 1975); Hall v. Garson, 430 
F.2d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1970), appeal after remand, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972). 
26 See the text of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503 (1962 official text) in note 68 
infra. 
27 Porter, No. 538 at 9. 
28 /d. 
29 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970), appeal after remand, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972). 
3o 430 F.2d at 439. 
31 Law of june 12, 1969, ch. 686 [1969] Tex. Laws (repealed 1973) provided: 
Section I. The operator of any residential house, apartment, duplex or other 
single or multi-family dwelling, shall have a lien upon all baggage and all other 
property found within the tenant's dwelling for all rents due and unpaid by the 
tenant thereof; and said operator shall have the right to take and retain possession 
of such baggage and other property until the amount of such unpaid rent is paid. 
Section 3 of the law exempted certain items from the reach of the lien, including all 
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of property were acts traditionally reserved to the state,32 the Fifth 
Circuit reasoned that the granting of this power to a private citizen 
clothed him with the authority of state law, and exercise of the power 
thus was state action. 33 The theory relied upon by the court was that 
an authorized, private undertaking of conduct normally reserved to 
the state constitutes state action, a rationale that has been labeled the 
public function theory. 34 
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Culbertson v. Leland, 35 finding state 
action in the Arizona innkeepers' lien statute, 36 involved a combina-
tion and refinement of the state action approaches adopted in Porter 
and Hall. The court first recognized that the lien statute created 
rights that did not exist at common law,37 and noted that state action 
is more likely to be found where a statute creates new rights, rather 
than where it represents a mere codification of previous rights. 38 The 
court then looked to other indicia of state action. First, it noted that 
allowing a lessor to execute a lien extending to all the tenant's 
goods-a roving lien-would be state authorization of a state func-
tion, under the public function theory.39 Second, a significant state in-
volvement was found in the statutory authorization of the seizure, in 
view of the absence of any private contractual right to the lien.40 Tak-
ing these factors into consideration, the Ninth Circuit found the 
state's role in the seizure to be significant.41 
clothes and tools of any trade. If a family was affected by the lien, such items as family 
portraits, some furniture, and one car and one truck were also exempted. /d. 
The new statute, TEX. REV. C1v. STAT. art. 2536d (1973) grants the lien with similar 
exemptions; however, in § 5 the law now requires that the landlord inform the tenant 
of the landlord's right to the lien in the written agreement. Section 4 provides: "A c~m­
tractual landlord's lien shall not be enforcable unless underlined or printed in con-
spicuous bol~ print in the rental agreement." 
32 430 F.2d at 439. 
33 /d. 
34 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). The Fifth Circuit 
did not specifically mention the "public function" theory; however, the label was ap-
plied in Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat') Bank, No. 74-1995, 10 (7th Cir., Sept. 30, 
1975). 
35 No. 73-1749 (9th Cir., Oct. 3, 1975). 
36 /d. at 9. ARIZ. REV. STAT,§ 33-951 (1956) provides in part: "Hotel, inn, boarding 
house, lodging house, apartment house and auto camp keepers shall have a lien upon 
the baggage and other property of their guests ... for charges due for accommodation, 
board, lodging or room rent and things furnished .... " 
37 Culbertson, No. 73-1749 at 7. 
38 /d. at 8. 
39 /d. at 8, 9. 
40 /d. at 9. 
41 /d. at 9. The concurring judge preferred to base his finding of state action purely 
on the public function theory. Id. at 12, 14 n.5 (concurring opinion). The dissenting 
judge reasoned that since the tenant had been evicted before seizure of the goods, the 
landlord came into possession of the goods as bailee, and thus did not misuse the power 
of the lien law, which merely permitted him to retain possession. /d. at 15, 17 (dissent-
ing opinion). This opinion states that even if the landlord had relied exclusively on the 
lien to seize the goods, no state action would exist so long as the lessor took possession 
of the property without breach of the peace. Id. at 16 (dissenting opinion). 
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Contrary conclusions have been reached by the First Circuit in Davis 
and the Seventh Circuit in Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat' I Bank. 42 Davis 
held that state authorization and regulation are not "significant" in-
volvements in a private action, and thus, do not support findings of 
state action. 43 The First Circuit also refused to classify the lien statute 
as one that created a new right, since one type of lessor, the inn-
keeper, had been granted such a lien at common law. 44 The Mass-
achusetts statute, the court said, merely broadened the class of lessors 
entitled to this common law right. 45 The court also questioned 
whether the common law distinction between innkeepers and other 
types of lessors was a proper basis for a state action finding, since re-
liance on common law history could lead to different results in differ-
ent jurisdictions, merely because of slight variations in the common 
law. 46 In reasoning virtually identical to that in Davis, the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Anastasia found no state action in seizures under authority of 
an Illinois lien statute for hotel proprietors.H The court also dis-
missed the public function argument, questioning whether the right 
granted had ever been traditionally reserved to the state. 48 
In summary, four United States Courts of Appeals have faced due 
process challenges to state lessors' lien statutes. The courts have 
evenly divided on the question of whether a lessor's action under the 
statutes constitutes state action. 
II. THEORIES UsED TO DETERMINE WHETHER STATE AcTION IS 
INVOLVED IN THE LESSORS' LIEN STATUTES 
A. THE PUBLIC FUNCTION THEORY 
1. Definition and Origin. When a private citizen is vested by state law 
with the power to perform a function traditionally reserved to the 
state, the exercise of that power is state action. In summarizing this 
public function theory in Evans v. Newton, 49 the United States Su-
42 No. 74-1995 (7th Cir., Sept. 30, 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3467 (Feb. 24, 
1976). 
43 512 F.2d at 203. 
44 !d. 
45 !d. 
46 !d. at 203-04, citing Burke and Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' 
Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 47 (1973) [hereinafter 
cited as Burke and Reber]. 
47 No. 74-1995, 8-9, 12 (7th Cir., Sept. 30, 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3467 (Feb. 
24, 1976). 
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, §57 (1966) provides in part: "Hotel, inn and boarding house 
keepers shall have a lien upon the baggage and other valuables of their guests or board-
ers brought into such hotel, inn or boarding house by such guests or boarders for the 
proper charges due .... " ILL REv STAT. ch. 71, § 2 (1959) is a similar statute applying 
to hotel proprietors only. 
48 No. 74-1995 at 11-12. 
49 382 u.s. 296 ( 1966). 
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preme Court stated that "when private individuals or groups are en-
dowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, 
they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to 
its constitutional limitations."50 
The public function theory was first used to strike down dis-
criminatory practices in party primary elections. In Smith v. Allwright, 51 
the United States Supreme Court held that the right to vote cannot be 
nullified by a state's "casting its electoral process in a form which 
permits a private organization to practice racial discrimination."52 The 
discrimination was state action because the primary election was con-
ducted under state statutory authority, and thus, the political party 
was acting as a state agent. 53 The Court added that "[s]tate delegation 
to a party of the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is 
delegation of a state function that may make the party's action the ac-
tion of the state."54 
Subsequently, in Evans v. Newton, 55 the Court found a public func-
tion where private citizens controlled a park in a discriminatory 
manner. 56 The park had been devised to the City of Macon, Georgia, 
to be run as a facility for whites only.57 The City turned it over to pri-
vate citizens in order to accomplish that goal. 58 The Court held that 
the public character of the park required that it be treated as a public 
institution, subject to constitutionallimitations.59 
The Supreme Court has also held, in Marsh v. Alabama, 60 that where 
a company-town has all the attributes of a municipality, the company 
may not deny First Amendment rights to persons on its premises. 61 
The decision blocked the prosecution for trespass of a person hand-
ing out religious leaflets within the town. 62 
2. Application of the Public Function Theory to the Lessors' Lien Cases. 
The first court to adopt the public function theory in the lessors' lien 
cases was the Fifth Circuit in Hall v. Garson. 63 The court reasoned that 
the landlord's action in entering the tenant's apartment and seizing 
the tenant's property had the characteristics of a state act, and there-
50 /d. at 299. 
51 321 u.s. 649 (1944). 
52 /d. at 664. 
53 /d. at 663-64. 
54 /d. at 660. 
55 382 u.s. 296 ( 1966). 
58 /d. at 299, 302. 
57 /d. at 297. 
58 /d. at 297-98. 
59 /d. at 302. 
80 326 u.s. 501 (1946). 
81 I d. at 509. 
82 /d. For other examples and a critical history of the public function theory, see 
Burke and Reber, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1050-74 (1973), 
83 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970), appeal after remand, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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fore was state action: 64 "The execution of a lien, whether a traditional 
security interest or a quasi writ of attachment or judgement lien has 
in Texas traditionally been the function of the Sheriff or constable."65 
Thus, the court held that since the state lien statute vested a private 
citizen-the lessor-with power to perform a state function, the en-
forcement of the lien involved state action.66 This vesting of a power 
in the landlord that was traditionally given only to state officials was 
the key to the state action finding, because it clothed the lessor with 
state authority. 67 
It appeared that the public function found in Hall was simply en-
trance into another's dwelling to execute a lien. Subsequent decisions 
of the Fifth Circuit, however, have refined the application of this 
theory. These decisions dealt with seizures under state enactments of 
section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code.68 Section 9-503 au-
thorizes private seizures by secured parties where the debtor has de-
faulted on payments and the collateral may be retaken without breach 
of the peace. 69 
In James v. Pinnix70 the Fifth Circuit held that seizures under the 
Code were analogous to actions traditionally performed by private 
parties, and thus, were not state functions. 71 The court distinguished 
Hall on the basis of the differences between the nature of the seizures 
allowed by lessors' liens and those allowed by the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. 72 In Hall, the lessor had seized goods in the tenant's apart-
ment to satisfy a debt (rent), arising out of a contract (their lease), that 
had nothing to do with the goods taken. 73 The court found that this 
seizure closely resembled a seizure in satisfaction of a judgement, a 
function traditionally performed by a sheriff. 74 In]ames, however, the 
creditor repossessed an item (a car) in which he had a specific pur-
64 430 F.2d at 439. 
65 I d. 
66 I d. 
67 Id. 
68 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503 ( 1962 official text) provides: "Unless otherwise 
agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In 
taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be 
done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action." The 1962 official text is 
cited because it served as a model for many state enactments. McDonnell, Sniadach, The 
Replevin Cases and Self-Help Repossession-Due Process Tokenism?, 14 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. 
REV. 437, 438 n.15 (1973). 
69 See note 68 supra. 
70 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974). 
71 Id. at 208. Similar cases include Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 611-12 
(6th Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern California First Nat'! Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 336-38 
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Bichel Optical Laboratories v. Mar-
quette Nat'! Bank, 487 F.2d 906, 907 (8th Cir. 1973). 
72 495 F.2d at 207-08. 
73 /d. at 208. 
74 I d. 
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chase money security interest. 75 Such a repossession was, according to 
state custom, traditionally performed by private parties, not state 
officials.76 The court also noted the absence in James of an entrance 
into another's horne as a second reason for distinguishing the two 
cases. 77 ' 
In Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 78 the Fifth Circuit decided that a 
repossession under the Code that did involve an entrance into the al-
leged debtor's horne was not state action under the public function 
theory. 79 The court down played the violation of the right to privacy 
in such seizures, while stressing the roving nature of the lessors' lien 
as the major reason that execution of that lien was a public function, 
even though a Code repossession was not. 80 Thus, the public function 
theory of state action in the lessors' lien cases, as set forth by the Fifth 
Circuit, is that the execution of a roving lien, a lien that resembles 
seizure in satisfaction of a judgment, is performance of a state func-
tion. 
The Ninth Circuit, in Culbertson v. Leland, 81 also adopted this theory 
of state action: "[The roving lien,] because its extent is broad and un-
defined and because its impact is potentially much more severe [than 
repossession of a specific chattel], is the type of activity which is a 
function of the state and over which, ordinarily, the state has a 
monopoly. "82 
The First and Seventh Circuits, in rejecting application of the public 
function theory to the lessors' lien cases, failed to mention the roving 
nature of the lien. Indeed, the courts favorably compared the lessors' 
liens to repossessions under the U niforrn Commercial Code83 or to 
75 /d. 
76 /d. 
77 Id. 
78 505 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1974). 
79 Id. at 951. 
80 /d. 
81 No. 73-1749 (9th Cir., Oct. 3, 1975). 
82 /d. at 9. The dissenting judge reasoned that the entrance into another's dwelling, 
not the roving nature of the lien, is the public function involved in seizures under the 
lessors' lien. Id. at 17 (dissenting opinion). To name entrance as the public function, 
however, would be contrary to the findings in the well-settled Code cases, and other 
cases involving common law self-help, in which entrance was a factor. See Fuentes v. 
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 79 n.12, where the Court recognized the right to distrain property 
without state aid, by self-help. 
Such a determination would also create a distinction between cases where the land-
lord entered the room and those where he merely changed the locks, although the ul-
timate effect-separation of the tenant from his goods-remains the same. It is sug-
gested that although entrance into the dwelling of another is a factor to be "sifted and 
weighed" in determining the existence of state action, it should not be considered dis-
positive. 
83 Davis, 512 F.2d at 202-03;Anastasia, No. 74-1995 at 4-5 n.1l. 
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other forms of self-help repossession of a specific chattel84-cases 
clearly distinguishable on the grounds of the extent of the lien. The 
question remains, however, whether these courts would have reached 
a contrary conclusion had the roving nature of the lien been called to 
their attention. 85 
A more important question is whether the United States Supreme 
Court would accept the public function theory in the lien cases, a 
question that may have been answered by the Court's latest decision 
involving the public function theory. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., 86 the Supreme Court referred to but rejected application of the 
public function theory to services provided by utility companies. 87 The 
Court stated that "[ w ]e have of course found state action present in 
the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively 
reserved to the State."88 The Court cited the power of eminent do-
main as such a power.89 Furnishing of utility services, however, had 
never been an obligation of the state.90 
It is submitted that Jackson narrows the scope of the public function 
theory as previously applied. In Jackson the Court spoke of powers 
"exclusively" reserved to the states, whereas previous decisions gener-
ally referred to functions merely "governmental in nature."91 This 
difference is vital in the lien cases. Althou~h power to execute a rov-
ing lien is clearly governmental in nature, 2 it has not been used ex-
clusively by the government. The present day lessors' lien statutes, 
which grant this right, evolved from common law innkeepers' liens 
which, because of the special obligations imposed upon the innkeeper 
at common law, granted such a power.93 Thus, under the Jackson 
interpretation of the public function theory, there would be no state 
action in the execution of roving liens. 
The test of exclusivity places an unwarranted emphasis on the his-
tory of the exercise of a power within an individual state. Since the 
84 /d. 
85 Apparently, this factor was never called to the attention of the First Circuit. The 
court summarized the plaintiffs public function argument as follows: "Since the execu-
tion of a lien by a sheriff or constable would constitute state action, plaintiff contends 
that it is merely formalistic to find no state action when a private individual performs a 
functionally similar act under the shield of a statutory scheme." 512 F.2d at 205 (em-
phasis added). The court rejected this argument, on the grounds that such a finding 
would destroy the boundaries between state and private actions, thus robbing the state 
action requirment of any meaning. !d. 
86 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See note 22 supra. 
87 419 U.S. at 352-53. 
88 /d. at 352 (emphasis added). 
89 /d. at 352-53. 
90 /d. at 353. 
91 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). See text at notes 55-59 supra. 
92 See text at notes 7 8-82 supra. 
93 The innkeepers' lien is discussed in the text at notes 111-18 infra. 
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common law powers of the state and the lessor could vary from juris-
diction to jurisdiction, anomalous results could occur. Thus, simple 
obedience to the historic tenets of the common law does not provide a 
satisfactory basis for a result so restrictive of constitutional protections 
where important property interests are involved.94 
Furthermore, ·as Justice Marshall noted in dissent, "[t]he whole 
point of the 'public function' cases is to look behind the state's deci-
sion to provide public services through private parties."95 It is submit-
ted that where the power is of such importance that it normally is ex-
ercised by the state, a public function should be found-a view consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's previous public function decisions. 96 
Thus, state action should be found in the lessors' lien cases, since the 
public importance attaching to the exercise of the roving lien has 
made it a power normally exercised by the state. As stated by Judge 
Ely, concurring in the Ninth Circuit's decision in Culbertson: 
[E]xercise of such a power is so fraught with dangers that it must 
be retained in the state so that it can be circumscribed by due 
process protections. Significant perils necessarily attend the arbi-
trary seizure .... The asserted debt may not be valid, and the sei-
zure may therefore be wholly unjustified .. Resistance from the 
debtor, with concomitant violence, may occur. The property 
seized may have a value that greatly exceeds the debt, or, on the 
other hand, the property seized may be essential to the satisfac-
tion of the basic human needs of the alleged debtor and his 
family. 97 
Thus, although a literal reading of Jackson would prohibit a public 
function finding in the lien cases, it is submitted that the better view is 
that the execution of a roving lien is an act the nature of which has 
traditionally been regarded as governmental and which must remain 
in the control of the State. Accordingly, due process protections 
should apply when the state authorizes execution by private individu-
als. 
B. SiGNIFICANT INVOLVEMENT STANDARD 
1. Definition and Origin. The United States Supreme Court has gen-
erally found the existence of state action in individual conduct where 
94 See text at note 128 infra. 
95 419 U.S. at 371 (dissenting opinion). 
96 See text at notes 49-62 supra. 
97 No. 73-1749 at 12 (concurring opinion). Judge Ely also noted a similarity between 
execution of a roving lien and the public function the majority in jackson said it would 
recognize: "Like the power exercised here, the power of eminent domain, where con-
ferred by a state on a private party, would enable that party to seize the property of 
another for his own purposes." Compare id. at 13 n.4 (concurring opinion), with Jackson, 
419 U.S. at 353. 
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the state in some way facilitated-perhaps by authorization or 
encouragement-the individual conduct.98 In Reitman v. Mulkey, 99 the 
Court adopted a broad approach to the state action question, conclud-
ing that state encouragement is state action} 00 In Reitman, the Court 
used a standard of a "significant state involvement" to find state ac-
tion and strike down an amendment to California's constitution that 
would have, in effect, made housing discrimination constitutionally 
permissible. 101 
The reach of the significant state involvement standard has, in re-
cent years, been narrowed by the Supreme Court. InJackson, the pri-
vate utility company's actions were not considered those of the state 
despite the state's heavy regulation of the utility. 102 The utility, acting 
on its own, had terminated power to defaulting customers, 103 without 
granting notice or a hearing. Had the state been actively involved, this 
action would have violated the customer's due process rights. 
The Court in Jackson restated the "significant state involvement" test 
of Reitman, concluding that for a state action determination "the in-
quiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the 
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity."104 The Court 
then held that where the initiative for an action comes from the pri-
vate sector, and state policy-in this case rulings from a utilities 
commission-did not order the conduct, but merely refused to disal-
low the conduct, the action is not state action. 105 
It appears that Jackson represents a new narrow view of state action 
m the Supreme Court106 requiring, for a state action determination 
under the significant involvement standard, that the state actually 
order the private conduct. Such a result would differ substantially 
from previous state action decisions.107 It is submitted, however, that 
Jackson should not be read as overruling previous state action deci-
sions, but rather as a narrow view of the state action doctrine in one 
specialized area-state regulation of economic activity. In its "suffi-
ciently close nexus" test, the Court refers specifically to situations in-
volving a regulated entity. It is suggested that this narrow approach 
was necessitated by the high degree of state regulation found in so 
98 See notes 19-22 supra. 
99 387 U.S. 369 ( 1967). See note 19 supra. 
100 /d. at 381. 
101 /d. at 377,381. 
102 419 U.S. at 358. 
103 /d. at 347. 
104 Id at 351. 
105 /d. at 357. 
106 See Note, 16 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 867, 869 (1975). 
107"[W]e have consistently indicated that state autlwrization and approval of 'private' 
conduct would support a finding of state action." Jackson, 419 U.S. at 369 (Marshall, J. 
di&senting) (emphasis added). 
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many important areas of the private sector. 108 Thus, the Court appar-
ently will now require that where state regulation is argued as a basis 
for finding significant state involvement, the regulation must be 
specifically tied to the challenged activity, and regulatory policy must 
actually order the particular private conduct. 109 To read such a re-
quirement into state action cases beyond the regulation area110 would 
be to distort the apparent meaning of the Court. Thus the standard 
for recognizing state action in nonregulated private conduct remains 
whether the state is significantly involved in the private conduct. 
2. Application of the Significant Involvement Standard to the Lessors' Lien 
Decisions. Several federal courts, and the Boston Housing Court in 
Porter, have reasoned that the lessors' lien statutes authorize and en-
courage seizures of property that would otherwise not be legal, and 
thus involve state action.U 1 The starting point of such an analysis is 
that the lien statutes are not codifications of the common law, but in-
stead create new rights in favor of the lessor. The court's review of 
common law history in Porter led to the conclusion that although a 
lien similar in scope did exist for one class of lessor-inn-
keepers112-the general lessor's lien did not exist at common law.U 3 
The privilege was granted to innkeepers because of their unique 
position at common law. They were obligated to accept all guests and 
safely keep their possessions, 114 and were strictly liable for any 
108 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972). 
109 jackson's "close nexus" test is apparendy little more than a firm statement of the 
holding in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), where the Court found 
no state action in a private club's racial discrimination despite the fact that the club held 
a state liquor license. ld. at 177. No relation existed between the challenged activity and 
the granting of the license. I d. 
110 In.Reitman, no state coercion was involved; however, no state regulatory activity 
was involved and thus the facilitation of racial discrimination in housing-the practical 
effect of the state's "free choice" constitutional amendment, 387 U.S. at 374-75-was a 
sufficiently significant involvement to support a finding of state action. Id. at 381. Nor 
was state coercion necessary for the state action determination in Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). The state, in leasing space to a private business 
which discriminated against blacks, was found to be a joint participant in the discrimi-
nation. I d. at 723, 725. Factors ·evidencing the interdependence of the state and lessee 
included the state's maintenance and repair responsibilities, id. at 724, but in no way in-
volved a state command that such conduct be undertaken; however, no regulatory activ-
ity was involved, and thus a state command was unnecessary to a finding of state action. 
111 Porter, No. 538 at 9-10; Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 114 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
State action was also found in Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390, 394 
(N.D. III. 1972). Collins, however, dealt with the same statutes upheld in Anastasia by the 
Seventh Circuit, No. 74-1995 at 5. The Porter and Klim reasoning was accepted without 
comment in Dielen v. Levine, 344 F. Supp. 823, 824 (D. Neb. 1972). This reasoning is 
often referred to as the "entwinement" theory, see, e.g., Anastasia, No. 74-1995 at 6, to 
indicate that the private conduct has become entwined with the governmental policies 
and thus is state action. 
111 Porter, No. 538 at 8. 
113 I d. at 8-9. 
114 I d. at 8. 
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losses.U5 To balance these obligations, the lien was granted.U6 At 
common law, boarding house and lodging house keepers did not have 
the same obligations as innkeepers, 117 and thus, neither group was 
granted a lien on the tenant's possessions.U8 
This historical background shows that the lessors' liens are statutory 
expansions of the common law. This expansion, authorizing and en-
couraging private seizures under authority of the law, serves as the 
basis for finding significant state involvement in such seizures. As 
stated in Klim v. Jones, 119 the lessor's seizure is not committed "against 
a backdrop of an amorphous state policy, but is instead action en-
couraged, indeed only made possible by explicit state author-
ization."120 
This approach has been unanimously rejected by the federal courts 
of appeals for a variety of reasons. First, a state action finding on the 
basis of state encouragement has been attacked on the ground that all 
state laws encourage private conduct. 121 Second, Reitman has been dis-
tinguished from cases involving the lien statutes. As the First122 and 
Seventh 123 Circuits have noted, the California constitutional amend-
ment in Reitman not only repealed existing fair housing laws, but also 
effectively precluded state agencies from prohibiting housing 
discrimination. 124 In Reitman the Court had said: 
The right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on 
racial grounds, was now embodied in the State's basic charter, 
immune from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any 
level of the state government. Those practicing racial discrimina-
tions need no longer rely solely on their personal choice. They 
could now invoke express constitutional authority, free from cen-
sure or interference of any kind from official sources.125 
In contrast, the First and Seventh Circuits, found that the lessors' 
lien statutes merely allowed certain private conduct.126 Both courts 
agreed that unlike the constitutional amendment in Reitman, the state 
115 /d. 
118 /d. at 9, citing from Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 120 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
117 Porter, No. 538 at 9. The boarding house keeper was required to provide board, 
but not room, and had no strict liability. Unlike the innkeeper, he had no right to enter 
the tenant's premises at any time. /d. The lien was not extended to the general landlord 
and tenant relationship. /d. at 8. 
118 /d. at 9. 
119 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
120 Id. at 114. 
121 Davis, 512 F.2d at 204. 
122 I d. at 203 n.4. 
128Anastasia, No. 74-1995 at 8. 
124 Reitman, 387 U.S. at 377. 
125 /d. 
128 512 F.2d at 203 n.4; No. 74-1995 at 8-9. 
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lessors' lien statutes are unremarkable, representing a modest change 
from the common law in the course of carrying out the continuing 
legislative function of defining creditors' rights. 127 
The First and Seventh Circuits thus properly refused to find state 
action solely on the basis of the statutory origin of the lien. However, 
as two commentators have stated: 
The focus for state action purposes should always be on the impact 
of the law upon the private ordering, not the law's age or historical 
underpinnings .... To make state action turn upon whether the 
statutory right being asserted has common law origins would lead 
to anomalous results. The identical private conduct, pursuant to 
the identical state statutory or judicial law, would be state action in 
some states while not in others depending solely upon the fortui-
tous and unimportant circumstances of the age and history of the 
law.128 
It is submitted that the Boston Housing Court, in Porter, has ap-
plied the wrong test for determining the existence of state action in 
seizures under the lessors' lien statutes. Courts must look not to the 
historical differences between innkeepers' and lodging house keepers' 
liens, or to the fact of later statutory codification, but to the practical 
effect of the statutory lien on the debtor-creditor relatonship. 129 
Only the Ninth Circuit has carefully considered the nature of the 
lien: "[W]e disagree with the proposition that lien statutes which 
create new rights in favor of creditor landlords have only a minimal 
impact on private ordering, especially when the parties themselves 
have failed to agree on a like ordering in the particular case."130 The 
court studied the lien itself, sought other indicia of state action, 131 and 
concluded that (1) execution of a roving lien is an exercise of a public 
function, 132 and (2) the absence of a private contractual agreement au-
127 /d. 
128 Burke and Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 7 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 47 (1973) (emphasis added). 
129 The same commentators 'who advocate this "impact" approach argue, however, 
that the impact is to be measured by whether the state law merely allows a private citi-
zen a choice of action or whether it mandates the action. Burke and Reber, State Action, 
Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL 
L. REV. 1003, 1107 ( 1973). Thus, their conclusion is that .if the state does not order the 
private conduct, there is no state action, the approach adopted by the Supreme Court 
in Jackson. It is submitted that the mandating approach must be limited to Jackson's 
particular facts. See text at notes 106-10 supra. The impact approach, however, should 
properly be regarded as simply ruling out the possibility that state action will be found 
solely on the basis of the common law origins of a statute, a factor that may still be 
taken into account, in "sifting facts and weighing circumstances," to determine the na-
ture of the lien and from that the existence of state action. 
13° Culbertson, No. 73-17 49 at 10. 
131 /d. at 8-9. 
132 /d. The Court, in effect, went full circle in first denying that it would rely solely 
on the common law origin of the lien statute, then placing emphasis on this factor. 
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thorizing the seizure meant that the seizure could not have been con-
templated or agreed to in advance by the alleged debtor. 133 Thus, the 
court-correctly, it is submitted-found a significant state involve-
ment in the seizure. 134 
All of the arguments in favor of applying the significant involve-
ment standard to the lessors' lien cases have nonetheless been rejected 
by numerous courts in cases involving self-help repossession under 
section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a somewhat analo-
gous situation. 135 It is possible, however, to find state action in the lien 
cases without disturbing the traditional right to self-help recognized in 
the U.C.C. cases, by carefully distinguishing the two situations. 
First, in U.C.C. cases, a creditor repossesses only goods in which he 
has a specific· purchase money security interest; 136 he may not seize 
any other goods. Second, resort to the U.C.C. provision is clearly op-
tional, taking place only in the absence of a private agreement. 137 The 
courts of appeals in the U.C.C. cases noted the fact that seizures were 
accomplished, not under the Code, but under private agreements. 138 
On the other hand, whereas the U.C.C. often serves merely to repeat 
and confirm a private agreement, actions under the lien statutes run 
contrary to the expectations of the tenant. The Ninth Circuit, in 
Culbertson, concluded that whereas the U.C.C. statute thus may be 
superfluous, the lien statute is not. 139 
It is thus submitted that a failure to find state action in cases involv-
ing seizures pursuant to section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial 
133 !d. at 9. 
134 !d. 
135 The courts of appeals that have considered Uniform Commercial Code reposses-
sion cases have unanimously failed to find state action. See cases cited in Anastasia, No. 
7 4-1995 at 4-5 n.ll. Some lower courts have reached the. opposite conclusion, e.g., 
Boland v. Essex County Bank and Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917, 919 (D. Mass. 1973). 
Commentators are also in disagreement. E.g., Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and 
Deficiency: A Journey to the Underworld and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. REV. 302 (1972) 
(finding state action); White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even 
More, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 503 (1973) (no state action). 
It is not necessarily the position of this comment that seizures in the Code cases do 
not involve state action. Rather, it is submitted that state action can be found in the lien 
cases even if the opposite result were reached in the Code cases. 
136 See text at notes 7 5-76 and note 68 supra. 
137 See note 68 supra. 
138 In Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th 
Cir. 1973), the court noted that "the procedures challenged herein by appellant involve 
only private actions arising out of the express written agreements between the parties." 
!d. at 907. See, e.g., Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 611 (6th Cir. 1974); Now-
lin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16, 17 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 
(1974). 
139 No. 73-1749 at 9. The U.C.C. provision was also a codification of the creditor's 
common law right, as noted by the various courts of appeals, e.g., Turner v. Impala 
Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 611 n.ll (6th Cir. 1974), whereas the lessors' lien expanded the 
common law. Although the factor alone should not result in a state action finding, see 
text at note 128 supra, it is a factor to be considered. 
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Code should not preclude a court from finding significant state in-
volvement, and thus, state action, in the lessors' lien cases.140 The ar-
guments presented in this section-that the lien statutes allow conduct 
otherwise illegal, authorize a dangerous roving lien, and defy the ex-
pectations of the tenant by allowing a seizure outside the authority of 
the rental agreement-which, taken together, demonstrate involve-
ment of the state to a significant degree in the private seizures, are 
not as strong as those supporting application of the public function 
theory. 141 However, there is enough merit to those arguments to 
permit a court to find state action in seizures under authority of the 
lessors' lien statutes.142 
III. Poucv CoNSIDERATIONS IN LEssoRs' LIEN CASES 
Although state action claims should be decided without regard to 
public policy considerations, any standard requiring a sifting of facts 
and weighing of circumstances leaves the door open for attention to 
such factors. 143 In recent United States Supreme Court decisions 
dealing with prejudgment seizures by the state, 144 the Court has at-
tempted to strike a balance between the conflicting interests of the 
creditor and alleged debtor. On the one hand, the alleged debtor 
140 The lessors' lien cases have also been favorably compared to other forms of self-
help repossession, such as the mechanics' liens, e.g., Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990 
(7th Cir. 1974) and the bankers' set-offs, e.g., Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust 
Nat'! Bank, 496 F.2d 927, 930 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1001 (1975). As the 
First Circuit stated in Fletcher: "[A] creditor who holds something of value to his debtor 
is differently situated from one who does not; he does not need the state to facilitate his 
collection efforts." 496 F.2d at 930. It is submitted that these cases in fact differ mark-
edly from the lessors' lien cases in that the right to seize arises against a specific item, 
already in the possession of the creditor, where the item itself is the subject of the debt. 
The lessor, on the other hand, has no goods in hand when the lessee's debt arises, and 
the goods he may seize have no relation to the debt itself. 
141 See text at notes 78-85 and 95-97 supra. 
142 Cf Neth, Repossession of Consumer Goods: Due Process for the Consumer, What's Due for 
the Creditor7, 24 CASEW. RES. L. REV. 7, 62 (1972). 
Although the merits of a case are considered separately from the state action ques-
tion, the factual situation in Culbertson was so offensive that the court may have been in-
dined to find state action partly on policy grounds. The tenant was a diabetic and al-
most totally blind. No. 73-1749 at 12-13 n.3 (concurring opinion). Among the items 
taken were special foods and medicine, items vital to the tenant but of little use to. the 
lessor, particularly if he intended to resell them. Id. (concurring opinion). Although not 
all seizures under authority of the lien statutes are likely to involve such misuses of 
power, the potential for such conduct cannot be ignored. Policy considerations are con-
sidered further in the text at notes 143-162 infra. 
148 For example, justice Marshall, dissenting in jackson, speculated that the Court's 
failure to fmd state action may have been partially a result of "its reluctance to impose 
on a utility company burdens that might ultimately hurt consumers more than they 
would help them." 419 U.S. at 373 (Marshall, j. dissenting). See the discussion of 
Culbertson at note 142 supra. 
14
.
4 See note 11 supra. 
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should be protected against seizures made upon the basis of invalid 
claims, while on the other hand, a creditor should not be left without 
a remedy. 145 
It is submitted that the Massachusetts boarding house and lodging 
house keepers' lien statute fails to provide the needed balance be-
tween the creditor and alleged debtor, because it fails to provide ade-
quate protection for the debtor. He may be locked from his room and 
deprived of any of his personal possessions without being given an 
opportunity to protest. Unlike the situation in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant 
Co., 148 where sequestration of personal property was upheld by the 
Supreme Court, 147 no showing of convincing proof of the debt is re-
quired to be made to a judge prior to a seizure under the lien law. In 
fact, seizures under the lessors' lien law do not meet even the pro-
cedural standards of the seizures struck down by the Court in Fuentes 
v. Shevin, 148 where the creditor had to at least allege to a court officer 
that the claimed debt was actually due. 149 Under the lessors' lien stat-
ute, the lessor ne~d not answer to any judge or court officer before 
the seizure is allowed. He may act solely on his own, under authority 
of state law. The goods he may seize bear no relation to the debt, and 
may be essential to the needs ofthe alleged debtor and his family. As 
the Supreme Court noted in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 150 such 
deprivations are most likely to affect the poor, and place upon them 
an unfair pressure to pay the debt, even if the claim is false. 151 The 
lessors' lien statutes allow seizures far broader than the wage gar-
nishment statutes at issue in Sniadach, and thus, are potentially more 
destructive.152 
Massachusetts does attempt to provide some protection for the les-
see. For instance, the creditor may not sell the goods taken without 
145 In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1967), the Court held uncon-
stitutional a Wisconsin wage garnishment procedure. ld. at 342. The Court noted that 
the statute was most likely to affect the poor, those most likely to be in debt, and those 
least able to bear the burden of having their wages garnished. I d. at 340-42. This hard-
ship would place great leverage upon the debtor to pay the creditor, even if the claim 
were false or fraudulent./d. at 341. 
In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court upheld sequestration of 
property sold under an installment sales contract. Id. at 601, 619. The Court stressed 
that both parties had an interest in the property, and that the creditor would suffer if 
repossession were delayed. I d. at 604, 608. 
148 416 u.s. 600 (1974). 
147 /d. at 619. 
148 407 u.s. 67 (1972). 
149 I d. at 96. 
150 395 u.s. 337 (1969). 
151 /d. at 342. 
151 Klim v.Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 122-124 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
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judicial involvement.153 The property owner also has the statutory 
right to redeem his possessions by posting a bond and seeking judicial 
intervention.154 Neither alternative, however, protects the lessee from 
the possibly unjustified, sudden loss of property. Furthermore, be-
cause it is the poor who will be affected, provisions calling for posting 
of a bond may be less than viable. Therefore, it is submitted that the 
interests of the tenant are not protected to the same extent as are the 
interests of the lessor under the Massachusetts boarding and lodging 
house keepers' law.155 
Legislative inaction has forced the courts to step in and choose a 
theory of state action to relieve the inequities of these antiquated 
laws. 156 This is not surprising, in view of the stronger political clout of 
landlords generally, and particularly in comparison to that of the 
transients often affected by the boarding and lodging house keepers' 
lien statute. Changes should be made legislatively, however, to include 
due process protections for the alleged debtor. These changes are 
warranted whether or not the courts find state action in the lessors' 
lien laws. 
Some changes have been made in Texas, where the landlord's lien 
statute exempts many personal and necessary items from the reach of 
the lien, and requires that the lien be the subject of a private contrac-
tual agreement. 167 The statute thus avoids state action difficulties by 
limiting the roving lien (the public function) 158 and by making the en-
trance and seizureauthorized not solely by statute, but by private con-
tracts (avoiding the significant involvement argument). 159 Nonetheless, 
while such a statute may take the lien out of the jurisdiction of the 
court by avoiding state action, it does little to create the needed bal-
ance of protection between landlord and tenant. 
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions on prejudgment 
seizures suggest further ways to alter the lessors' lien statutes to create 
that balance. Judicial involvement prior to the seizure, requiring proof 
153 G.L. c. 255, §§ 26-29, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 1114, §§ 3~0-332. Such provi-
sions are typical of lessors' lien statutes. For the purposes of this comment, reference to 
such provisions has not been necessary, since the lessors' seizures involved in the cases 
under consideration had not progressed to this step. Sales under such statutes have, in 
themselves, been held unconstitutional. E.g., Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 
295 (E.D. Pa. 1970), where heavy reliance was placed on the Sniadach decision. 
154 G.L. c. 255, § 33 ( 1952), as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 1114, § 333. 
155 In Holt v. Brown, 336 F. Supp. 2, 6 (W.D. Ky. 1971) and Shaffer v. Holbrook, 
346 F. Supp. 762, 765-66 (S.D. W. Va. 1972), these same remedies afforded to the les-
sors fell short of the due process protections required by Sniadach. See text at notes 
150-52 and note 145 supra. 
156 See, e.g., Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 120-21 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Porter, No. 538 
at 5. 
157 See note 31 supra. 
158 See text at notes 80-82 supra. 
159 See text at notes 98-110 supra. 
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that the debt is valid, 160 and limitation of the present lien law to "ex-
traordinary circumstances"1611are two possibilities. The law, of course, 
must not tilt the necessary balance in favor of the tenant. 162 For ex-
ample, provision must be made for a lessor who suspects that a tenant 
is about to flee the jurisdiction, without paying his rent. In this situa-
tion, long court procedures would harm the creditor significantly. 163 
The workings of such a statute require the reasoned consideration of 
the Legislature. Particularly in view to the conflicting decisions of the 
Boston Housing Court in Porter and the First Circuit in Davis, there 
must be immediate legislative reform. 
CONCLUSION 
This comment has surveyed the lessors' lien decisions and analyzed 
the various arguments used by courts to find or deny the existence of 
state action in seizures under the authority of the lien statutes. It is 
submitted that such seizures do constitute state action, particularly 
under the public function theory-which states that where private 
parties are given powers normally reserved to the state, in this case 
the power to exercise a roving lien, their actions are subject to con-
stitutional limitations-and possibly under the significant involvement 
standard, which states that private conduct facilitated by the state to a 
high degree is state action. New lien laws, striking a proper balance of 
protection between lessor and lessee, should be enacted by the Legis-
lature whether or not the present lien statutes are declared uncon-
stitutional by the courts. 
jAcKJ. MIKELS 
1•o Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 616. 
181 Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 339. Extraordinary circumstances would exist, for example, 
where the taking is necessary to secure an important governmental or general public in-
terest and where there is a need for prompt action. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 
90-91 ( 1972). Summary seizure has been allowed to collect internal revenue of the gov-
ernment, to meet the needs of a national wa:t:. effort, arid to• protect the public from 
misbranded drugs and contaminated food. Id. at 91-92. 
182 [T]he innkeeper will not be left to the mercy of lodgers by the instant decision 
[holding the lessor's lien statute unconstitutional]. The court is not purporting to 
abolish the innkeeper's lien, but only to require that it be conditioned by the pro-
cedural due process safeguards discussed by the Supreme Court in Sniadach. 
Moreover, a feasible if not entirely attractive alternative exists by which the 
California proprietor can guarantee that he will be paid, namely payment in ad-
vance. 
Klim, 315 F. Supp. at 124. 
183 0ne argument in favor of the lessor .is that the lien is his sole protection against 
such defaults. However, as the court in Klim pointed out: "The boarder who desires to 
leave the jurisdiction without paying his bill can easily do so and take all his possessions 
with him, so that threat of a lien IS hardly an iron-dad safeguard for the California 
proprietor." 315 F. Supp. at 124. 
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